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COVID-19: A Crisis and an Opportunity to 
Improve the Emergency Use Authorization 
Process 
Daniel Walsh, Ph.D* 
 
The pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus has thrown 
the world into chaos. The virus has necessitated the use of the 
emergency use authorization (EUA) process by the FDA to speed 
public access to vaccines. This Note reviews the EUA process as 
codified in 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 and presents research on the 
history of § 360bbb-3. This Note argues that this historical con-
text highlights how § 360bbb-3 as written is ill suited to the chal-
lenges posed by public health in the context of authorizing a vac-
cine for an emerging infectious disease. This Note discusses how 
the EUA process functioned in the context of SARS-CoV-2, in 
particular examining the events surrounding hydroxychloro-
quine. This Note argues that these events demonstrate that the 
process as codified in § 360bbb-3 is unsuited for authorizing vac-
cines for emerging infectious diseases. In particular this Note 
argues that the EUA process as codified fails to account for the 
social benefits afforded by vaccine induced herd immunity which 
is predicated on public trust in the safety of authorized vaccines. 
Finally, this Note proposes an alternative framework for emerg-
ing infectious disease vaccine EUAs based on the FDA’s regula-
tory actions in approving vaccines during the SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is currently expe-
riencing a crisis of legitimacy.1 The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has 
made it necessary for the agency to approve therapies via emer-
gency use authorizations (EUAs),2 but the agency is also publicly 
perceived to be acting politically.3 FDA’s mission is twofold: it 
must “promote the public health” by approving new therapies in 
a “timely manner” but it must also “protect the public health” by 
“ensuring . . . drugs are safe and effective.”4 Right or wrong, 
FDA’s actions to satisfy its dual mandate have come to be per-
ceived by some as political maneuvering.5 Public confidence in 
vaccines is paramount to achieving widespread immunization, 
which in turn is necessary to the ultimate aim of achieving vac-
cine-induced herd immunity.6 At the same time, pandemic infec-
tious disease outbreaks are expected to become more and more 
 
 1. See Lindsey R. Baden, et al., The FDA and the Importance of Trust, 384 
N. ENG. J. MED. e148(1), e148(2) (2020)(“[T]he trust the FDA has built and 
maintained over the past century is eroding.”); see also Kyle Thomson & Her-
schel Nachlis, Emergency Use Authorizations During the COVID-19 Pandemic: 
Lessons From Hydroxychloroquine for Vaccine Authorization and Approval, 324 
JAMA 1282, 1282 (2020) (“[P]roblems include the authorization of potentially 
ineffective or unsafe therapeutics, the appearance of nonexpert political advo-
cacy generating public pressure for product authorizations with questionable 
safety and efficacy, and the imposition of significant costs on the health of the 
public and on the credibility and influence of . . . the FDA.”). 
 2. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION FOR VAC-
CINES TO PREVENT COVID-19: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/142749/download [hereinafter OCTOBER FDA GUID-
ANCE] (expressing the FDA’s vaccine EUA guidance position in October 2020); 
see also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPMENT AND LICENSURE OF VACCINES TO 
PREVENT COVID-19: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (June 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/139638/download [hereinafter JUNE FDA GUID-
ANCE] (expressing the FDA’s vaccine EUA guidance position in June 2020). 
 3. E.g., Nathaniel Weixel, Government Watchdog to Investigate Allega-
tions of Trump Interference at CDC, FDA, HILL (Oct. 19, 2020 2:15 PM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/521716-government-watchdog-to-investi-
gate-allegations-of-trump-interference-at-cdc (reporting a Senate request for in-
vestigation into “political interference with public health agencies”). 
 4. 21 U.S.C. § 393. 
 5. National Tracking Poll #2008114: (Aug. 26–28 2020), MORNING CON-
SULT (Sept. 3, 2021), https://assets.morningconsult.com/wp-up-
loads/2020/09/03131941/2008114_crosstabs_FDA_Adults_v1_LM-1.pdf (show-
ing 28% of respondents think FDA approval decisions relating to SARS-CoV-2 
treatments and vaccines are based on political pressure as opposed to science 
(49%) or don’t know / no opinion (23%)). 
 6. See Haley E. Randolph & Luis B. Barreiro, Herd Immunity: Under-
standing COVID-19, 52 IMMUNITY 737, 737 (2020) (“[Herd Immunity] refers to 
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common in the future and, by implication, the FDA will be called 
on to issue more and more EUAs.7 In particular, the FDA will 
need to issue EUAs for vaccines, as they are one of the most ef-
fective public health interventions ever invented.8 
The events of the COVID-19 crisis at the FDA are revealing. 
The EUA process9 was not created with emerging diseases in 
mind, and a different balance of safety and efficacy is necessary 
to address this threat.10 The EUA process is also heavily reliant 
on executive branch norms that have already been breached and, 
to this end, the broad administrative fiat conferred to the FDA 
to issue EUAs for vaccines should be restricted in the context of 
 
the indirect protection from infection conferred to susceptible individuals when 
a sufficiently large proportion of immune individuals exist in a population.”). 
 7. See Juliet Bedford, et al., A New Twenty-First Century Science for Ef-
fective Epidemic Response, 575 NATURE 130, 130 (2019) (arguing that “[w]ith 
rapidly changing ecology, urbanization, climate change, increased travel and 
fragile public health systems, epidemics will become more frequent, more com-
plex and harder to prevent and contain.”); see also WORLD ECON. FORUM, OUT-
BREAK READINESS AND BUSINESS IMPACT PROTECTING LIVES AND LIVELIHOODS 
ACROSS THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 7 (2019), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/WEF%20HGHI_Outbreak_Readiness_Business_Impact.pdf 
[hereinafter: WEF WHITE PAPER] (citing factors such as “growth in travel, trade 
and connectivity,” human expansion into previously uninhabited spaces, and 
climate change as increasing the risk of infectious disease outbreaks). 
 8. While this Note touches on issues of vaccine safety readers should not 
draw the conclusion that modern vaccines are not safe and effective. Vaccines 
are one of the safest and most effective public health interventions ever in-
vented. See generally Vanessa Rémy, York Zöllner & Ulrike Heckmann, Vac-
cination: The Cornerstone of an Efficient Healthcare System, 3 J. MKT. ACCESS 
& HEALTH POL’Y 27041, 27041 (2015) (“During the 20th century, improved san-
itation, nutrition, and the widespread use of antibiotics as well as vaccines have 
all contributed to the decreased incidence of numerous diseases and associated 
mortality. Vaccination was one of the public health measures that had the 
greatest impact on the reduction of the burden from infectious diseases and as-
sociated mortality, especially in children. It is estimated that, each year world-
wide, vaccines prevent up to 3 million deaths.”) (citations omitted); Paul A. Of-
fit, Robert L. Davis & Deborah Gust, Vaccine safety, in VACCINES 1629,1629–
1650 (Stanley A. Plotkin, Walter A. Orenstein, Paul A. Offit eds., 2008) (review-
ing procedures in place to ensure vaccine safety); Matthew Z. Dudley, et al., The 
State of Vaccine Safety Science: Systematic Reviews of the Evidence, 20 LANCET 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE e80, e80 (2020) (Concluding “[v]accines have an excellent 
safety profile overall and provide protection against infectious diseases to indi-
viduals and the general population.”). This Note addresses only whether the 
EUA process contains the appropriate statutory guardrails to ensure that fu-
ture hypothetical vaccines are safe and therefore effective. 
 9. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (enabling the EUA process). 
 10. Infra Part II.C (describing the origins of the EUA process). 
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pandemic diseases.11 An alternative emerging infectious disease 
vaccine EUA pathway should be created that retains the EUA 
standards for efficacy, but which raises the bar on safety to be 
similar to traditional FDA vaccine approval. This change is not 
intended to hamstring the agency’s ability to employ sound sci-
entific judgment, but rather, to support it. A formalized frame-
work could support the FDA’s legitimacy, promote regulatory ex-
pediency in crisis, and ensure scientific rigor in the context of an 
expedited approval process that necessarily rebalances speed, 
safety, and efficacy. 
This Note will begin by reviewing scientific information on 
SARS-CoV-2 (the causative virus of the disease COVID-19) and 
the role of vaccination in ending the COVID-19 crisis. Then, it 
will explain FDA’s role in vaccine development and approval via 
the EUA process and the legislative developments that lead to 
the EUA process as it exists today. Finally, this Note will sum-
marize the implementation of the EUA process in response to 
COVID-19 and explain why it has led to a perception of political 
interference with agency decision making. 
This Note will argue that the hydroxychloroquine EUA 
demonstrates the failings of the current EUA process and that a 
distinct EUA process for emerging infectious disease vaccines 
should be codified with a higher standard of safety.12 The stand-
ard this Note advocates is inspired by the level of review em-
ployed by the FDA to authorize vaccines in the SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic.13 This Note argues that regulatory actions of the FDA 
relating to the emergency authorization of the Pfizer-BioNTech14 
and Moderna SARS-CoV-2 vaccines had appropriate scientific 
 
 11. Infra Part II.D–E (describing the implementation of the EUA process 
generally and in the context of COVID-19). 
 12. Specifically, the safety standard codified by 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), which 
indicates approval should be denied if “[(1) submissions to the FDA] do not in-
clude adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or 
not such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; (2) the results of such tests show 
that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions or do not show that 
such drug is safe for use under such conditions; . . . [or] (4) upon the basis of the 
information submitted to him as part of the application, or upon the basis of any 
other information before him with respect to such drug, he has insufficient in-
formation to determine whether such drug is safe for use under such condi-
tions . . . .” 
 13. Infra Part II.E (describing the FDA’s guidance on the COVID-19 EUA 
process). 
 14. This Note will refer to this as the Pfizer vaccine, for brevity. 
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support, but were the result of institutional inertia rather than 
a sound statutory framework. This Note does not argue that the 
FDA should use the same regulatory process for emerging infec-
tious disease vaccine EUAs as is used for a typical New Drug 
Application (NDA)15 but rather that the current statutory EUA 
standard for safety is inappropriate in the context of vaccines 
intended for emerging infectious diseases. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE VIRUS SARS-COV-2 
In 2019 a novel virus, eventually named SARS-CoV-2, 
emerged in the area around Wuhan, China.16 The SARS-CoV-2 
virus causes the disease COVID-19.17 This virus spread quickly 
and was declared a pandemic illness by the World Health Or-
ganization in March of 2020.18 While the majority of COVID-19 
cases are mild, a subset of patients experience a life threatening 
form of the disease that requires hospitalization.19 A smaller 
fraction of cases are fatal.20 The burden of COVID-19 is not 
 
 15. This Note suggests adopting §355(d)’s legal standard for safety. It does 
not argue that this new regulatory pathway should mirror the NDA process as 
implemented by the FDA in practice (requiring complete phase I, II, and III 
clinical trials to obtain approval). 
 16. See Ben Hu, et al., Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19, 19 
NAT’L REV. MICROBIOLOGY 141, 141 (2020) (“At the end of 2019, a novel corona-
virus designated as SARS-CoV-2 emerged in the city of Wuhan, China, and 
caused an outbreak of unusual viral pneumonia. Being highly transmissible, 
this novel coronavirus disease, also known as coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19), has spread fast all over the world.”) (citations omitted). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Tedros Adhanom, World Health Organization Director-General, 
Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020), in 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/de-
tail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-
19—-11-march-2020 (“We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 
can be characterized as a pandemic.”). 
 19. See Hu, supra note 16 at 148 (“In a report of 72,314 cases in China, 81% 
of the cases were classified as mild, 14% were severe cases that required venti-
lation in an intensive care unit (ICU) and a 5% were critical (that is, the patients 
had respiratory failure, septic shock and/or multiple organ dysfunction or fail-
ure).”) (citations omitted). 
 20. Two different metrics of fatality are presented. Case Fatality Rate 
(CFR) measures deaths in those diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Infec-
tion Fatality rate (IFR) is an estimate of deaths among anyone who was infected 
with SARS-CoV-2. Because many SARS-CoV-2 infections are asymptomatic, 
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evenly distributed through the population: severe disease is 
more common in the elderly21 and disadvantaged communities22 
due to a variety of factors, including preexisting disparities in 
medical care23 and socioeconomic disadvantage.24 In every pop-
ulation, symptoms of COVID-19 can persist for months after in-
itial symptom onset.25 Long-term issues associated with SARS-
CoV-2 infection include damage to the cardiovascular, pulmo-
nary, and nervous systems including brain tissue.26 
 
IFR is necessary lower. See Gideon Meyerowitz-Katz & Lea Merone, A System-
atic Review and Meta-Analysis of Published Research Data on COVID-19 Infec-
tion Fatality Rates, 101 INT. J. INFECT. DIS. 138, 138 (2020) (“The meta-analysis 
demonstrated a point estimate of IFR of 0.68% (0.53%–0.82%) with high heter-
ogeneity (p < 0.001).”); see also Wan Yang, et al., Estimating the Infection-Fa-
tality Risk of SARS-CoV-2 in New York City During the Spring 2020 Pandemic 
Wave: a Model-Based Analysis., 21 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE 203, 203 
(2020) (“We estimated an overall infection-fatality risk of 1.39% (95% credible 
interval 1.04–1.77) in New York City.”). 
 21. See Yang et al., supra note 20, at 203 (“[C]umulative estimated infec-
tion-fatality risk of 0.116% (0.0729–0.148) for those aged 25–44 years and 
0.939% (0.729–1.19) for those aged 45–64 years versus 4.87% (3.37–6.89) for 
those aged 65–74 years and 14.2% (10.2–18.1) for those aged 75 years and 
older.”). 
 22. See Donald J. Alcendor, Racial Disparities-Associated COVID-19 Mor-
tality Among Minority Populations in the US, 9 J. CLIN. MED. 2442, 2444 (2020) 
(“An examination of 131 predominantly [African American (AA)] counties shows 
a COVID-19 infection rate of 137.5 per 100,000 and a death rate of 6.3 per 
100,000, which is three times higher than the predominant [non-Hispanic 
White] counties. Moreover, the death rate for the AA counties were found to be 
six times higher than the rate observed in predominant white counties.”). 
 23. See id. at 2452 (“Longstanding health disparities such as diabetes, hy-
pertension, CVD, and pulmonary disease among minority populations in the US 
may serve to predispose these communities to SARS-CoV-2 infection and in-
creased risk for clinically severe COVID-19.”). 
 24. See Matthew A. Raifman & Julia R. Raifman, Disparities in the Popu-
lation at Risk of Severe Illness From COVID-19 by Race/Ethnicity and Income, 
59 AM. J. PREV. MED. 137, 137 (2020) (“Among those aged <65 years, 40% of 
low-income people were at higher risk (PR=1.63, 95% CI=1.59, 1.67) relative to 
24% of those with higher income . . . .”); see also J. A. Patel, et al., Poverty, Ine-
quality and COVID-19: the Forgotten Vulnerable, 183 PUBLIC HEALTH 110, 110 
(2020) (highlighting potential mechanisms that translate economic disad-
vantage into a higher risk of COVID-19). 
 25. See Michael Marshall, The Lasting Misery of Coronavirus Long-Haul-
ers, 585 NATURE 339, 339 (2020) (“Months after infection with SARS-CoV-2, 
some people are still battling crushing fatigue, lung damage and other symp-
toms of ‘long COVID’.”). 
 26. See Carlos del Rio, Lauren F. Collins & Preeti Malani, Long-term 
Health Consequences of COVID-19, 324 JAMA 1723, 1723–1724 (2020) (review-
ing evidence of chronic symptoms post COVID-19). 
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The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 is not unexpected.27 Respir-
atory viral pandemics are a recurring occurrence in human his-
tory.28 SARS-CoV-2 is closely related to other respiratory viruses 
known to infect humans such as SARS-CoV-1 and MERS-CoV 
(which cause serious disease in human hosts) but also endemic 
viruses including HCoV-NL63, HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, and 
HCoV-HKU1 (which typically cause mild disease states similar 
to the common cold).29 Epidemics and pandemics are predicted 
to become more common in the future, driven by factors such as 
increasing interconnectedness and climate change.30 
B. DEVELOPING A VACCINE 
A safe and effective vaccine is the clearest path out of the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.31 Vaccines are a crowning achievement 
of modern medicine.32 Emerging technologies such as RNA and 
 
 27. In 2018 Bill Gates spoke about the likelihood of emerging pandemic 
diseases in 2018 and advocated for a “coordinated global approach” to confront-
ing them. See Bill Gates, Shattuck Lecture (Apr. 27, 2018), in Press Room, BILL 
& MELINDA GATES FOUND., https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Cen-
ter/Speeches/2018/04/Shattuck-Lecture-Innovation-for-Pandemics. 
 28. See generally Rashed Noor & Syeda Muntaka Maniha, A Brief Outline 
of Respiratory Viral Disease Outbreaks: 1889–Till Date on the Public Health 
Perspectives, 31 VIRUSDISEASE 441 (2020) (reviewing history of respiratory 
pandemics). 
 29. See Vivaldo Gomes da Costa, Marcos Lázaro Moreli & Marielena Vogel 
Saivish, The Emergence of SARS, MERS and Novel SARS-2 Coronaviruses in 
the 21st Century, 165 ARCHIVES VIROLOGY 1517, 1517–1524 (2020) (reviewing 
the emergence of SARS-CoV-1, SARS-CoV-2, and MERS-CoV); see also Victor 
M Corman, et al., Hosts and Sources of Endemic Human Coronaviruses, 100 
ADVANCES VIRUS RES. 163, 163–179 (2018) (reviewing research on endemic hu-
man coronaviruses). 
 30. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Debby van Riel & Emmie de Wit, Next-Generation Vaccine Plat-
forms for COVID-19, 19 NAT. MATERIALS 810, 810 (2020) (“Consensus among 
experts is that only an effective COVID-19 vaccine will end the pandemic.”); see 
also Nsikan Akpan, A ‘Herd Mentality’ Can’t Stop the COVID-19 Pandemic. Nei-
ther Can a Weak vaccine, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.na-
tionalgeographic.com/science/2020/10/natural-herd-immunity-mentality-can-
not-stop-coronavirus-weak-vaccine-cvd/ (“‘It’s very unlikely that we’re going to 
see elimination of COVID-19 altogether from the population simply through the 
buildup of natural immunity,’ says Pitzer. But if we add a highly effective vac-
cine on top of that, Pitzer says, ‘then it is theoretically possible that we could 
eliminate the virus” or at least control it.’”) (quoting Virginia Pitzer, Associate 
Professor of Epidemiology, Yale School of Public Health). 
 32. See generally Brian Greenwood, The Contribution of Vaccination to 
Global Health: Past, Present and Future, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. 
LONDON BIOLOGY 20130433 (2014) (“[I]t is indisputable that vaccination has 
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viral vector vaccines have increased the pace of vaccine develop-
ment considerably.33 This resulted in an unprecedented number 
of SARS-CoV-2 vaccines entering development and clinical tri-
als.34 Vaccines can act to either prevent infection (sterilizing im-
munity) or to prevent disease (partially protective immunity).35 
Both sterilizing and partially protective immunity have the sec-
ondary benefit of reducing the ability of the virus to spread in 
the local community via vaccine-induced herd immunity.36 How-
ever, achieving vaccine-induced herd immunity requires immun-
izing a significant share of the population, enough that the virus 
 
made an enormous contribution to human and animal health, especially in the 
developing world. Mortality from smallpox and measles was massive in the pre-
vaccination period with up to a half of the population dying from the former 
during epidemics and measles was only a little less lethal in susceptible popu-
lations.”). 
 33. See van Riel & de Wit, supra note 31, at 810 (“The main advantage of 
next-generation vaccines is that they can be developed based on sequence infor-
mation alone. If the viral protein(s) important to provide protection from infec-
tion or disease, and thus for inclusion in a vaccine (that is, the vaccine antigen), 
is known the availability of coding sequences for this viral protein(s) suffices to 
start vaccine development, rather than having to depend on the ability to cul-
ture the virus. This makes these platforms highly adaptable and speeds up vac-
cine development considerably . . . .”); see also Susanne Rauch, et al., New Vac-
cine Technologies to Combat Outbreak Situations., 9 FRONTIERS IMMUNOLOGY 
1963 (2018) (reviewing new vaccine technologies immediately prior to the pan-
demic). 
 34. Jeff Craven , COVID-19 Vaccine Tracker, REG. FOCUS (Mar. 18, 2021), 
https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2020/3/covid-19-vaccine-
tracker (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) (listing all SARS-CoV-2 vaccines currently 
in clinical trials). 
 35. Heidi Ledford, What the Immune Response to the Coronavirus Says 
About the Prospects for a Vaccine, 585 NATURE 20, 21–22 (2020) (explaining 
sterilizing immunity: “response, typically mediated by antibodies, that can rap-
idly prevent a returning virus from gaining ground in the body . . . ” and protec-
tive immunity: “immunity could be strong enough to reduce or even eliminate 
symptoms . . . a vaccine that could reduce mortality would likely still be help-
ful . . . ”). See generally Angela Choi, et al., Non-Sterilizing, Infection-Permissive 
Vaccination With Inactivated Influenza Virus Vaccine Reshapes Subsequent Vi-
rus Infection-Induced Protective Heterosubtypic Immunity From Cellular to Hu-
moral Cross-Reactive Immune Responses, 11 FRONTIERS IMMUNOLOGY 1166 
(2020) (applying the concepts of sterilizing and protective immunity to influenza 
vaccines). 
 36. See Michael L Mallory, Lisa C Lindesmith & Ralph S Baric, Vaccina-
tion-Induced Herd Immunity: Successes and Challenges, 142 J. ALLERGY CLIN-
ICAL IMMUNOLOGY 64, 64 (2018) (“In addition to individual protection, vaccina-
tion programs also rely on population or ‘herd’ immunity: immunization of large 
portions of the population to protect the unvaccinated, immunocompromised, 
and immunologically naive by reducing the number of susceptible hosts to a 
level less than the threshold needed for transmission.”). 
2021] COVID-19 177 
 
runs out of potential hosts susceptible to infection.37 Experts es-
timate that 60–75% of people must be immune to achieve herd 
immunity to SARS-CoV-2.38 However, these estimates rely on 
assumptions about the virus and immune response that may not 
hold true in practice.39 The bottom line is that a herculean public 
 
 37. See Randolph & Barreiro, supra note 6, at 737 (“In a completely naive 
population, a pathogen will propagate through susceptible hosts in an un-
checked manner following effective exposure of susceptible hosts to infected in-
dividuals. However, if a fraction of the population has immunity to that same 
pathogen, the likelihood of an effective contact between infected and susceptible 
hosts is reduced, since many hosts are immune and, therefore, cannot transmit 
the pathogen. If the fraction of susceptible individuals in a population is too few, 
then the pathogen cannot successfully spread, and its prevalence will decline. 
The point at which the proportion of susceptible individuals falls below the 
threshold needed for transmission is known as the herd immunity threshold.”). 
 38. See Christie Aschwanden, The False Promise of Herd Immunity for 
COVID-19, 587 NATURE 26, 26–28 (2020) (reviewing expert estimates on herd 
immunity); see also Lewis F. Buss et al., Three-quarters Attack Rate of SARS-
CoV-2 in the Brazilian Amazon During a Largely Unmitigated Epidemic, 371 
SCIENCE 288, 292 (2021) (“Our data show that >70% of the population had been 
infected in Manaus about 7 months after the virus first arrived in the city. This 
is above the theoretical herd immunity threshold. However, prior infection may 
not confer long-lasting immunity.”). 
 39. See Aschwanden, supra note 38, at 27–28 (“Although plugging numbers 
into the formula spits out a theoretical number for herd immunity, in reality, it 
isn’t achieved at an exact point. Instead, it’s better to think of it as a gradient, 
says Gypsyamber D’Souza, an epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins University in 
Baltimore, Maryland. And because variables can change, including R0 and the 
number of people susceptible to a virus, herd immunity is not a steady state.”); 
Roy M. Anderson et al., Challenges in Creating Herd Immunity to SARS-CoV-2 
Infection by Mass Vaccination, 396 LANCET 1614, 1615 (2020) (“Given an 
R0 value before lockdowns in most countries of between 2·5 to 3·5, we estimate 
the herd immunity required is about 60–72%. If the proportional vaccine effi-
cacy, ε, is considered, the simple expression for pc becomes [1 – 1 / R0] / ε. If we 
assume ε is 0·8 (80%), then the herd immunity required becomes 75–90% for 
the defined range of R0 values. For lower efficacies, the entire population would 
have to be immunised. These overall estimates ignore heterogeneities that can 
make these figures lower or higher in specific locations.”) 
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health effort will be necessary to vaccinate enough people to con-
trol the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.40 Anything that dis-
suades individuals from getting vaccinated41 will negatively im-
pact the health of the larger population,42 especially the well-
being of individuals who cannot effectively be vaccinated due to 
underlying health conditions.43 
C. FDA’S ROLE IN VACCINE DEVELOPMENT 
The FDA regulates the safety and approval of vaccines in 
the United States.44 Under normal circumstances, vaccines must 
 
 40. See Kenneth Gorelick, Here’s How Hard it Will Be to Distribute a Coro-
navirus Vaccine, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/25/covid-vaccine-distribution-logistics/ (“Rapidly 
distributing a safe and effective vaccine across the nation is likely to be one of 
the most significant logistical challenges ever undertaken by the government 
within our borders.”). 
 41. See Sarah Kreps et al., Factors Associated with US Adults’ Likelihood 
of Accepting COVID-19 Vaccination, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Oct. 2020, at 1, 1–
13 (surveying Americans on different factors that affect their decision whether 
or not to receive a hypothetical SARS-CoV-2 vaccine); see also Jeanine P. D, 
Guidry et al., Willingness to Get the COVID-19 Vaccine with and Without Emer-
gency Use Authorization, 49 AM. J. INFECT. CONTROL 137, 137–42 (2020) (sur-
veying Americans on “demographics and psychosocial predictors of intent to get 
a future COVID-19 vaccine as well as willingness to get such a vaccine under 
EUA.”). 
 42. See Lynne Peeples, Rethinking Herd Immunity, 25 NAT. MED. 1178, 
1178–80 (2019) (explaining the effects of “vaccine hesitancy” on the larger pop-
ulation). 
 43. See, e.g., Jan Smetana et al., Influenza Vaccination in the Elderly., 14 
HUM. VACCINE IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 540, 540 (2018) (“[P]rimary prevention 
via immunization is effective in reducing the burden of influenza illness among 
the elderly. However, the elderly may be insufficiently protected by vaccination 
due to the immunosenescence which accompanies aging. In addition, vaccine 
hesitancy among the younger populations increases the likelihood of circulating 
infectious diseases, and thus concomitant exposure.”). 
 44. See Vaccines, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-
blood-biologics/vaccines (last visited Nov. 16, 2020) (“The Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research (CBER) [a division of FDA] regulates vaccine prod-
ucts.”). 
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utilize the Investigational New Drug (IND)45 and Biologics Li-
cense Application (BLA)46 processes to obtain FDA approval.47 
However, in an emergency the FDA gains access to the Emer-
gency Use Authorization (EUA) process codified at 21 U.S.C. § 
360bbb-3.48 The EUA process originated as § 1603 of the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.49 Origi-
nally, emergency use could only be authorized in response to “a 
military emergency, or a significant potential for a military 
emergency, involving a heightened risk to United States military 
forces of attack with a specified biological, chemical, radiological, 
or nuclear agent or agents.”50 The process was amended by the 
Project BioShield Act of 2004 to permit authorization in response 
to “a public health emergency . . . that affects, or has a signifi-
cant potential to affect, national security, and that involves a 
specified biological . . . agent or agents, or a specified disease or 
 
 45. See Investigational New Drug (IND) or Device Exemption (IDE) Process 
(CBER), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biolog-
ics/development-approval-process-cber/investigational-new-drug-ind-or-device-
exemption-ide-process-cber (last visited Nov. 16, 2020) (“An Investigational 
New Drug Application (IND) is a request for authorization from the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) to administer an investigational drug or biological 
product to humans. Such authorization must be secured prior to interstate ship-
ment and administration of any new drug or biological product . . . .”). 
 46. See Biologics License Applications (BLA) Process (CBER), U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/development-ap-
proval-process-cber/biologics-license-applications-bla-process-cber (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2020) (“The Biologics License Application (BLA) is a request for per-
mission to introduce, or deliver for introduction, a biologic product into inter-
state commerce.”). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2021) (prohibiting introduction of biologics into 
interstate commerce without an approved BLA). 
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2021). 
 49. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-136, § 1603, 117 Stat. 1392, 1684 (2003) (prior to 2004 amendment). 
 50. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 § 1603; see 
H.R. REP. NO. 108-354, at 782 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing a rejected senate 
amendment that would “authorize the President to waive the right of service 
members to refuse administration of a product . . . ” under EUA); H.R. REP. NO. 
108-106, pt. 1, at 361 (2003) (“The conditions under which the countermeasures 
could be used are identical to those current in effect under section 731(a) of the 
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1999 for 
the use of investigational new drugs.”); see also Strom Thurmond National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261 § 731(a), 112 
Stat. 1920, 2070–71 (establishing a “Process for Waiving Informed Consent Re-
quirement for Administration of Certain Drugs to Members of Armed Forces for 
Purposes of a Particular Military Operation”). 
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condition that may be attributable to such agent or agents.”51 
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization 
Act of 2013 added the possibility of an authorization in the event 
of “a significant potential for a public health emergency” as pre-
viously defined.52 More minor changes followed in 201653 and 
2017.54 The EUA process emerged in the shadow of terrorism;55 
an early case even endorsed the EUA process permitting admin-
istration of an anthrax vaccine “on a voluntary basis, pursuant 
to the terms of a lawful [EUA] . . . .”56 
D. THE EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION PROCESS AS CODIFIED 
IN 21 U.S.C. § 360BBB-3 
The current version of the EUA process57 is reliant on the 
formal declaration of an emergency made by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS).58 In some instances, the dec-
 
 51. Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, § 4, 118 Stat. 835, 
854 (2004) (prior to 2013 amendment). 
 52. The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 
2013, Pub. L. No. 113-5 § 302, 127 Stat. 161, 180 (2013) (prior to 2016 amend-
ments). 
 53. See 21st Century Cures Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-255 § 3088, 130 
Stat. 1033, 1148–49 (2016) (“Clarifying Food and Drug Administration emer-
gency use authorization”) (prior to 2017 amendments). 
 54. See Pub. L. No. 115-92, 131 Stat. 2023, 2023–25 (2017) (“authoriz[ing] 
additional emergency uses for medical products to reduce deaths and severity 
of injuries caused by agents of war . . . .”). 
 55. See Matthew W. McCarthy et al., Make Pre-approval Covid-19 Vaccines 
Available Through Expanded Access, Not an EUA, STAT (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/09/expanded-access-not-eua-for-distrib-
uting-preapproval-covid-19-vaccines/ (“[E]mergency use authorization . . . was 
actually designed for counterterrorism measures to address chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological, and nuclear hazards—not necessarily a pandemic.”). 
 56. Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-707 (EGS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5573, at *3 
(D.D.C. Apr. 6, 2005). 
 57. See generally Summary of Process for EUA Issuance, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-le-
gal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/summary-process-eua-issuance (last vis-
ited Nov. 16, 2020) (summarizing the EUA process). 
 58. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b) (2021) (describing the process by which a 
“[d]eclaration of emergency or threat justifying emergency authorized use” is 
made). This authority has been delegated to the FDA Commissioner. See FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMIN., SMG 1410.10, FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDES, VOLUME II – 
DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY (2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/81983/down-
load (delegating EUA authority from Secretary of HHS to FDA Commissioner); 
see also FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., OMB Control No. 0910-0595, EMERGENCY 
USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: 
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laration may be made based on an initial determination by ei-
ther the Secretary of Homeland Security59 or Defense60 that 
there is a national security-related emergency or threat. More 
relevant to emerging diseases, the declaration may also be based 
on an initial determination by the Secretary of HHS themselves 
“that there is a public health emergency, or a significant poten-
tial for a public health emergency . . . that involves a biologi-
cal . . . agent or agents, or a disease or condition that may be at-
tributable to such agent or agents . . . .”61 Regardless of the 
source of the initial determination, the Secretary of HHS must 
then make a subsequent formal declaration “that the circum-
stances exist justifying the authorization . . . .”62 
The FDA commissioner63 is thereafter empowered to actu-
ally issue an EUA if the criteria defined by 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-
3(c) are met.64 These criteria include firstly: that the agent in 
question “can cause a serious or life-threatening disease or con-
dition . . . .”65 Secondly, that “based on the totality of scientific 
 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS (2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download (expressing FDA’s view of the legal 
authority undergirding EUAs). 
 59. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(A), (D) (describing a determination by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security that there is a domestic emergency “involv-
ing a heightened risk of attack with a biological, chemical, radiological, or nu-
clear agent or agents” or that there was a material threat identified pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b(c)(2)(A) (2021) (“The Home-
land Security Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary [of HHS] and the 
heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall on an ongoing basis . . . assess cur-
rent and emerging threats of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
agents; and . . . determine which of such agents present a material threat 
against the United States population sufficient to affect national security.”). 
 60. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(B) (describing a determination by the 
Secretary of Defense “that there is a military emergency . . . involving a height-
ened risk . . . of attack with . . . a biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear 
agent or agents . . . .”). 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(C). The 2004 version of the law referenced 
42 U.S.C. § 247d for this public health emergency declaration, but this reference 
was removed when the law was amended in 2013. See Project Bioshield Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, § 4, 118 Stat. 835, 854 (2004) (prior to 2013 amend-
ment); see also The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization 
Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-5 § 302, 127 Stat. 161, 180 (2013) (prior to 2016 
amendments). 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1). 
 63. See FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., SMG 1410.10, supra note 58 (delegating 
EUA authority from Secretary of HHS to FDA Commissioner). 
 64. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c). 
 65. Id. at § 360bbb-3(c)(1). 
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evidence available to the Secretary [of HHS], including data 
from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials, if available, it 
is reasonable to believe that . . . the product may be effective in 
diagnosing, treating or preventing” the subject of the emergency 
declaration and that “the known and potential benefits of the 
product . . . outweigh the known and potential risks . . . ” when 
used to treat the subject of the emergency declaration.66 Thirdly, 
that “there is no adequate, approved, and available alternative 
to the product . . . .”67 Finally, “that such other criteria as 
the Secretary may by regulation prescribe are satisfied.”68 These 
determinations are made “after consultation with the Assis-
tant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the Director of 
the National Institutes of Health, and the Director of the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (to the extent feasible 
and appropriate given the applicable circumstances . . . ).”69 
If an EUA is granted, notice must be published in the Fed-
eral Register.70 The EUA must state “each disease or condition 
that the product may be used to diagnose, prevent, or treat,” the 
FDA commissioner’s conclusions regarding the risk benefit 
tradeoff, and the conclusions as to safety and efficacy including, 
if possible, “an assessment of the available scientific evidence.”71 
The secretary is permitted to place additional “[c]onditions of 
[a]uthorization” upon an EUA “as the Secretary finds necessary 
or appropriate to protect the public health . . . ”72 Conditions in-
 
 66. Id. at § 360bbb-3(c)(2). Note that this section also allows for an EUA for 
a product that treats a disease or condition “caused by a product authorized un-
der this section . . . .” Id. at § 360bbb-3(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 67. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(3). 
 68. Id. at § 360bbb-3(c)(5). There is one additional criteria that only applies 
when the determination leading to the formal declaration comes from subsec-
tion (b)(1)(B)(ii); in that case, the request for emergency use can only be made 
by the Secretary of Defense. Id. at § 360bbb-3(c)(4); see id. at § 360bbb-
3(b)(1)(B)(ii) (describing a determination by the Secretary of Defense “that there 
is a military emergency . . . involving a heightened risk of attack with . . . an 
agent or agents that may cause, or are otherwise associated with, an immi-
nently life-threatening and specific risk to the United States military forces.”). 
 69. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c). 
 70. See id. at § 360bbb-3(h)(1) (“The Secretary shall promptly publish in 
the Federal Register a notice of each authorization, and each termination or 
revocation of an authorization under this section, and an explanation of the rea-
sons therefor . . . .”). 
 71. Id. at § 360bbb-3(d). 
 72. Id. at § 360bbb-3(e). 
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clude informed use assurance, reporting obligations, and distri-
bution restrictions.73 The EUA lasts until either it is revoked,74 
or the HHS secretary’s declaration is terminated.75 The FDA has 
broad discretion to revoke an EUA.76 Finally, agency action on 
EUAs is exempt from normal Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) review.77 
E. THE EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION PROCESS IN PRACTICE 
On February 4, 2020, the Secretary of HHS simultaneously 
made the initial declaration of a public health emergency in re-
sponse to SARS-CoV-278 and secondary declaration that “circum-
stances exist justifying the authorization of emergency use of in 
vitro diagnostics.”79 Additional secondary declarations followed: 
“personal respiratory protective devices” on March 2, 2020,80 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at § 360bbb-3(g). 
 75. Id. at § 360bbb-3(f).   
 76. Id. at § 360bbb-3(g)(2) (“The Secretary may revise or revoke 
if . . . [among other reasons] other circumstances make such revision or revoca-
tion appropriate to protect the public health or safety.”).  
 77. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(i) (“Actions under the authority of [§ 360bbb-
3] by the Secretary, by the Secretary of Defense, or by the Secretary of Home-
land Security are committed to agency discretion.”); see also Association of Am. 
Physicians & Surgeons v. United States FDA, No. 20-1784, 2020 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 30622, at *8 (6th Cir. Sep. 24, 2020) (“[E]mergency-use authorizations 
are exempt from review under the APA.”). This means the agency action is re-
viewed under the highly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard. See gener-
ally John C. Moore, Judicial Review Under the APA of “Agency Action Commit-
ted to Agency Discretion by Law”, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 360, 360–72 (1972) 
(reviewing the procedural implications of Congress choosing to exempt agency 
action from APA review). 
 78. See Determination of Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 7316 
(“[T]here is a public health emergency that has a significant potential to affect 
national security or the health and security of United States citizens living 
abroad and that involves a novel (new) coronavirus (nCoV) first detected in Wu-
han City, Hubei Province, China in 2019 (2019-nCoV).”). 
 79. Id. (“[O]n the basis of my determination of a public health emer-
gency . . . that involves the novel (new) coronavirus (2019-nCoV) . . . circum-
stances exist justifying the authorization of emergency use of in vitro diagnos-
tics for detection and/or diagnosis of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) . . . .”). 
 80. See Emergency Use Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 13907 (“[O]n the basis of 
my determination of a public health emergency . . . that involves the novel 
(new) coronavirus . . . circumstances exist justifying the authorization of emer-
gency use of personal respiratory protective devices during the COVID-19 out-
break . . . .”). 
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“medical devices” on March 24, 2020,81 and “drugs and biological 
products” on March 27, 2020.82 The FDA also issued nonbinding 
guidance in June83 and October84 to help vaccine manufacturers 
understand the scientific standards the FDA intended to employ 
in reviewing any potential EUA and to highlight scientific issues 
the FDA was particularly concerned with. The October guidance 
made it clear the FDA was willing to issue a vaccine EUA based 
on data derived from a partially completed phase III clinical 
trial, at the earliest.85 The first EUA came into effect on Febru-
ary 4, 2020, authorizing the Center for Disease Control’s (CDC) 
RT-PCR diagnostic test for nucleic acids.86 The CDC test soon 
become infamous for an issue with one of the reagents which im-
pacted test results.87 
On March 19 then President Trump began advocating for 
the use of the drug hydroxychloroquine sulfate (commonly 
known as hydroxychloroquine, or HCQ) to treat COVID-
19/SARS-CoV-2 infection.88 At the time, scientific evidence of the 
 
 81. See Emergency Use Authorization Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 17335 
(“[O]n the basis of my determination of a public health emergency . . . that in-
volves the novel (new) coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2 . . . circumstances exist justi-
fying the authorization of emergency use of medical devices . . . .”). 
 82. See Notice of Emergency Use Authorization Declaration, 85 Fed. Reg. 
18250 (“[O]n the basis of my determination of a public health emer-
gency . . . that involves the novel (new) coronavirus . . . circumstances exist jus-
tifying the authorization of emergency use of drugs and biological products dur-
ing the COVID–19 pandemic . . . .”). 
 83. See JUNE FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2 (expressing the FDA’s vaccine 
EUA guidance position in June 2020). 
 84. See OCTOBER FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2 (expressing the FDA’s vac-
cine EUA guidance position in October 2020). 
 85. Id. (“FDA acknowledges the potential to request an EUA for a COVID-
19 vaccine based on an interim analysis of a clinical endpoint from a Phase 3 
efficacy study.”). 
 86. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LETTER AUTHORIZING EMERGENCY USE 
OF 2019-nCoV RT-PCR (Mar. 15, 2020) (reissuing the original Feb. 4, 2020 au-
thorization with amendments). 
 87. See Jon Cohen, The United States Badly Bungled Coronavirus Test-
ing—But Things May Soon Improve, SCIENCE (Feb. 28, 2020, 5:45 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/02/united-states-badly-bungled-corona-
virus-testing-things-may-soon-improve (“CDC finally started to send kits to 
state and local health labs on 5 February. But on 12 February, it revealed that 
several labs had difficulty validating the test because of a problem with one of 
the reagents.”). 
 88. See Libby Cathey, Timeline: Tracking Trump Alongside Scientific De-
velopments on Hydroxychloroquine, ABC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2020 7:12 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-tracking-trump-alongside-scientific-
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safety and efficacy of HCQ and chloroquine phosphate (com-
monly known as chloroquine or CQ) was limited to an unblinded 
clinical trial89 and in vitro studies.90 An EUA issued on March 
28, 2020 for CQ and HCQ.91 The CDC reported an approximately 
1.85 fold increase in prescription dispensation of HCQ and CQ 
immediately following the EUA.92 The events surrounding this 
EUA received widespread media coverage, a media landscape re-
view found that “stories discussing President Donald Trump and 
hydroxychloroquine are more numerous than all stories com-
bined that cover companies and individual researchers working 
on COVID-19 vaccines.”93 The decision to issue an EUA was crit-
icized by former FDA executives94 and the head of Biomedical 
 
developments-hydroxychloroquine/story?id=72170553 (establishing a timeline 
of President Trump’s advocacy for HCQ). 
 89. See Philippe Gautret et al., Hydroxychloroquine and Azithromycin as a 
Treatment of COVID-19: Results of an Open-Label Non-Randomized Clinical 
Trial, 56 INT. J. ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS, 2020, at 1 (“COVID-19 patients were 
included in a single arm protocol from early March to March 16th, to receive 
600mg of hydroxychloroquine daily and their viral load in nasopharyngeal 
swabs was tested daily in a hospital setting . . . . Twenty cases were treated in 
this study and showed a significant reduction of the viral carriage at D6-post 
inclusion compared to controls . . . .”). 
 90. See Xueting Yao et al., In Vitro Antiviral Activity and Projection of Op-
timized Dosing Design of Hydroxychloroquine for the Treatment of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), 71 CLINICAL INFEC-
TIOUS DISEASES 732, 732 (2020) (“The pharmacological activity of chloroquine 
and hydroxychloroquine was tested using SARS-CoV-2–infected Vero cells.”); 
see also Manli Wang et al., Remdesivir and Chloroquine Effectively Inhibit the 
Recently Emerged Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in Vitro, 30 CELL RESEARCH 
269, 270 (2020) (“Vero E6 cells were infected with 2019-nCoV at an MOI of 0.05 
in the treatment of different doses of the indicated antivirals for 48 h.”). 
 91. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Letter of Authorization – Chloroquine 
Phosphate and Hydroxychloroquine Sulfate (2020) (authorizing emergency use 
of HCQ and CQ). 
 92. 759,186 prescriptions in March 2020 compared to 407,959 in March 
2019. Lara Bull-Otterson et al., Hydroxychloroquine and Chloroquine Prescrib-
ing Patterns by Provider Specialty Following Initial Reports of Potential Benefit 
for COVID-19 Treatment — United States, January–June 2020, 69 MORBITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1210, 1210–15 (2020) (tracking new and continuing 
prescriptions of HCQ and CQ). 
 93. Bruce Sacerdote, Ranjan Sehgal & Molly Cook, Why Is All Covid-19 
News Bad News? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 28110, 
2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28110. 
 94. See Charles Piller, Former FDA Leaders Decry Emergency Authoriza-
tion of Malaria Drugs for Coronavirus, SCIENCE (Apr. 7, 2020, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/former-fda-leaders-decry-emer-
gency-authorization-malaria-drugs-coronavirus (quoting Scott Gottlieb and 
Margaret Hamburg discussing how the “EUA for chloroquine phosphate and 
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Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) 
claimed he was demoted and later fired because he opposed HCQ 
on scientific grounds.95 On April 24, 2020 the FDA issued a state-
ment warning that HCQ could cause heart problems when used 
in conjunction with azithromycin, a common antibiotic.96 The 
President later claimed that he himself took HCQ on May 18, 
2020.97 However, on June 15, 2020 the FDA revoked HCQ’s EUA 
citing the failure of a recent clinical trial.98 Despite this, the 
 
hydroxychloroquine sulfate undermines FDA’s scientific authority because it 
appeared to be a response not to scientific evidence, but to fervent advocacy of 
the drugs by Trump and other political figures . . . ”). 
 95. See Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Health Dept. Official Says 
Doubts on Hydroxychloroquine Led to His Ouster, N. Y. TIMES (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/rick-bright-trump-hy-
droxychloroquine-coronavirus.html (“Dr. Bright . . . assailed the leadership at 
the health department, saying he was pressured to direct money toward hy-
droxychloroquine, one of several ‘potentially dangerous drugs promoted by 
those with political connections’ and repeatedly described by the president as a 
potential ‘game changer’ in the fight against the virus.”). 
 96. See FDA Cautions Against Use of Hydroxychloroquine or Chloroquine 
for COVID-19 Outside of the Hospital Setting or a Clinical Trial Due to Risk of 
Heart Rhythm Problems, FDA DRUG SAFETY PODCAST (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/fda-drug-safety-podcasts/fda-cautions-against-use-
hydroxychloroquine-or-chloroquine-covid-19-outside-hospital-setting-or (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2020) (warning HCQ and CQ “have not been shown to be safe 
and effective for treating or preventing COVID-19 . . . we authorized their tem-
porary use . . . for treatment of the virus in hospitalized patients when clinical 
trials are not available . . . .”); see also Sarah M. Lofgren et al., Safety of Hy-
droxychloroquine Among Outpatient Clinical Trial Participants for COVID-19, 
7 OPEN FORUM INFECTIOUS DISEASE, Oct. 2020, at 1 (finding in November 2020 
that “[d]ata from 3 outpatient COVID-19 trials demonstrated that gastrointes-
tinal side effects were common but mild with the use of hydroxychloroquine 
while serious side effects were rare. No deaths occurred related to hydroxychlo-
roquine. Randomized clinical trials, in cohorts of healthy outpatients, can safely 
investigate whether hydroxychloroquine is efficacious for COVID-19.”). 
 97. See Nikki Carvajal & Kevin Liptak, Trump Says He is Taking Hy-
droxychloroquine Though Health Experts Question its Effectiveness, CNN (May 
19, 2020, 4:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/politics/donald-trump-hy-
droxychloroquine-coronavirus/index.html (“‘A couple of weeks ago, I started 
taking it,’ Trump said. He later said he’d been taking it every day for a week 
and a half.”). 
 98. See FDA, LETTER REVOKING EUA FOR CHLOROQUINE PHOSPHATE AND 
HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE SULFATE (June 15, 2020) (“Today’s request to revoke is 
based on new information, including clinical trial data results, that have led 
BARDA to conclude that this drug may not be effective to treat COVID-19 [Coro-
navirus Disease 2019] and that the drug’s potential benefits for such use do not 
outweigh its known and potential risks.”) (alteration in original). 
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President continued to advocate for the drug, claiming the revo-
cation was political.99 Later studies published in the fall of 2020 
confirmed that short term use of HCQ was safe, but long term 
use or use in conjunction with azithromycin could lead to heart 
issues.100 
The antiviral drug remdesivir was issued EUA on May 1, 
2020.101 Despite scientific controversy about its efficacy in a sub-
set of patients,102 remdesivir received full FDA approval on Oc-
tober 22, 2020.103 Actual approval of remdesivir was subject to 
 
 99. See Cathey, supra note 88 (“‘Hydroxy has tremendous support, but po-
litically it is toxic, because I supported it. If I would have said, “Do not use hy-
droxychloroquine under any circumstances,” they would have come out and they 
would have said it’s a great thing,’ Trump tells White House reporters.”). 
 100. See Jennifer C E Lane et al., Risk of Hydroxychloroquine Alone and in 
Combination With Azithromycin in the Treatment of Rheumatoid Arthritis: A 
Multinational, Retrospective Study, 2 LANCET RHEUMATOL, 698, 698 (2020) 
(“No excess risk of severe adverse events was identified when 30-day hy-
droxychloroquine and sulfasalazine use were compared. Self controlled case se-
ries confirmed these findings. However, long-term use of hydroxychloroquine 
appeared to be associated with increased cardiovascular mortality (calibrated 
HR 1·65 [95% CI 1·12–2·44]). Addition of azithromycin appeared to be associ-
ated with an increased risk of 30-day cardiovascular mortality (calibrated HR 
2·19 [95% CI 1·22–3·95]), chest pain or angina (1·15 [1·05–1·26]), and heart 
failure (1·22 [1·02–1·45]).”); see also Lofgren et al., supra note 96, at 1 (“Data 
from 3 outpatient COVID-19 trials demonstrated that gastrointestinal side ef-
fects were common but mild with the use of hydroxychloroquine, while serious 
side effects were rare. No deaths occurred related to hydroxychloroquine. Ran-
domized clinical trials, in cohorts of healthy outpatients, can safely investigate 
whether hydroxychloroquine is efficacious for COVID-19.”). 
 101. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VEKLURY (REMDESIVIR) EUA LETTER 
OF APPROVAL (2020) (reissuing EUA for remdesivir, which originally issued on 
May 1, 2020). 
 102. See Pauline Vetter et al., Dexamethasone and Remdesivir: Finding 
Method in the COVID-19 Madness, THE LANCET MICROBE 309 (2020) (“Alt-
hough remdesivir was shown to have an effect in shortening time to hospital 
discharge in patients with severe pneumonia, data are conflicting in patients 
without hypoxaemia.”) (citations omitted). 
 103. See FDA Approves First Treatment for COVID-19, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announce-
ments/fda-approves-first-treatment-covid-19 (“Today, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration approved the antiviral drug Veklury (remdesivir) for use in 
adult and pediatric patients 12 years of age and older and weighing at least 40 
kilograms (about 88 pounds) for the treatment of COVID-19 requiring hospital-
ization.”) (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). 
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further controversy because the sponsor, Gilead, received a pri-
ority review voucher,104 a valuable, transferrable incentive 
worth a considerable sum on the private market.105 
Finally, in September 2020, the President suggested that a 
vaccine might be available prior to the 2020 Presidential elec-
tion.106 Scientists associated with the administration down-
played this statement107 and no vaccine received authorization 
before the election.108 In response to fears that an unsafe vaccine 
would be approved for political reasons, a number of states 
formed expert panels to review safety and efficacy data prior to 
distributing any vaccine.109 Polling across the United States re-
 
 104. See id. (“The Agency also granted this application a Material Threat 
Medical Countermeasure Priority Review Voucher, which provides additional 
incentives for certain medical products intended to treat or prevent harm from 
specific chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats.”). 
 105. See Zachary Brennan, FDA Approves remdesivir as First Coronavirus 
Drug, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/news/2020/10/22/fda-approves-remdesivir-coronavirus-431336 (“The 
voucher is potentially worth about $100 million.”). 
 106. See Charles Schmidt, Don’t Expect a COVID Vaccine Before the Elec-
tion, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.scientificameri-
can.com/article/dont-expect-a-covid-vaccine-before-the-election/ (“‘We’re going 
to have a vaccine very soon,’ Trump said. ‘Maybe even before a very special 
day—you know what day I’m talking about.’”). 
 107. See Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Fauci Says a Coronavirus Vaccine Is ‘Un-
likely’ by U.S. Election, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2020, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/08/coronavirus-vaccine-dr-fauci-says-its-un-
likely-it-will-be-ready-by-us-election.html (“Fauci said it’s more likely a vaccine 
will be ready by ‘the end of the year . . . .’”). 
 108. See FDA Takes Key Action in Fight Against COVID-19 By Issuing Emer-
gency Use Authorization for First COVID-19 Vaccine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG AD-
MIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-ac-
tion-fight-against-covid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2020) (“For Immediate Release: December 11, 2020 To-
day, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued the first emergency use au-
thorization (EUA) for a vaccine for the prevention of coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) in individuals 16 years of age and older. The emergency use authoriza-
tion allows the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine to be distributed in the 
U.S.”). 
 109. See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Noah Higgins-Dunn, Trump Says 
Coronavirus Vaccine Won’t Be Delivered to New York Right Away, CNBC (Nov. 
13, 2020 4:31 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/13/trump-says-coronavirus-
vaccine-wont-be-delivered-to-new-york.html (“The governor [of New York] said 
the state would independently review the vaccines after many questioned 
whether the White House was attempting to rush the approval process ahead 
of Election Day for political reasons.”). 
2021] COVID-19 189 
 
flected acute concern about the vaccine with only 51% of Ameri-
cans saying they “definitely” or “probably” “would get the vac-
cine” in September 2020 following the administration’s state-
ments, a sharp decline from 72% indicating intention to get a 
hypothetical vaccine in May 2020.110 By December 2020 poll 
numbers had recovered with 71% indicating they would “defi-
nitely or probably get a vaccine.”111 In September, nine vaccine 
manufacturers took the unusual step of pledging to “make the 
safety and well-being of vaccinated individuals our top priority” 
and that they would “[o]nly submit for approval or emergency 
use authorization after demonstrating safety and efficacy 
through a Phase 3 clinical study that is designed and conducted 
to meet requirements of expert regulatory authorities such as 
FDA.”112 In October, the Government Accountability Office ac-
cepted a request from a handful of United States Senators to “re-
view whether the CDC and FDA’s scientific integrity and com-
munications policies have been violated and whether those 
policies are being implemented as intended to assure scientific 
integrity throughout the agency.”113 Finally, in December, 
things came to a head when the President threatened to fire the 
 
 110. See Alec Tyson, Courtney Johnson & Cary Funk, U.S. Public Now Di-
vided Over Whether To Get COVID-19 Vaccine, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/09/17/u-s-public-now-divided-over-
whether-to-get-covid-19-vaccine/ (showing a decline in individuals who said 
they would get the vaccine from May to September 2020); see also Shannon 
Mullen O’Keefe, One in Three Americans Would Not Get COVID-19 Vaccine, 
GALLUP (Aug. 7, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/317018/one-three-ameri-
cans-not-covid-vaccine.aspx (“35% of Americans would not get free, FDA-ap-
proved vaccine if ready today”). See generally Tara C Smith, Vaccine Rejection 
and Hesitancy: A Review and Call to Action, 4 OPEN FORUM INFECT. DIS. (Jul. 
18, 2017), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28948177 (reviewing factors con-
tributing to vaccine hesitancy prior to SARS-CoV-2). 
 111. See Liz Hamel, Ashley Kirzinger, Cailey Muñana & Mollyann Brodie, 
KFF COVID-19 Vaccine Monitor: December 2020, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 
15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/report/kff-covid-19-vaccine-
monitor-december-2020/ (“a new KFF survey finds an increase in the share of 
the public saying they would definitely or probably get a vaccine for COVID-19 
if it was determined to be safe by scientists and available for free to everyone 
who wanted it. This share now stands at 71%, up from 63% in a September 
survey . . . .”). 
 112. Biopharma Leaders Unite to Stand With Science, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 8, 
2020 6:30 AM), https://www.business-
wire.com/news/home/20200908005498/en/. 
 113. Letter from Gov’t Accountability Off. to Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator 
(Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-
0015%20Warren.pdf. 
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head of the FDA if Pfizer’s vaccine did not receive an EUA by the 
end of the day.114 The Pfizer vaccine received an EUA the same 
day as these threats.115 A vaccine made by Moderna received an 
EUA a week later.116 
The FDA began working with regulated entities early in the 
pandemic, issuing guidance documents in June and October in-
dicating what kinds of clinical trials the FDA expected to see in 
order to grant an EUA.117 In these guidance documents, the FDA 
“acknowledge[d] the potential to request an EUA for a COVID-
19 vaccine based on an interim analysis of a clinical endpoint 
from a Phase 3 efficacy study.”118 Such interim analyses were 
submitted to the FDA119 and included data supporting both 
 
 114. See Jonathan Lemire, Darlene Superville & Matthew Perrone, White 
House Threatens FDA Chief’s Job Over Vaccine Approval, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-business-mark-mead-
ows-coronavirus-pandemic-0902fbb041b0459e55da86be75b1457a (“Hours be-
fore the Food and Drug Administration authorized the first COVD-19 vaccine 
late Friday, a high-ranking White House official told the agency’s chief he could 
face firing if the vaccine was not cleared by day’s end, two administration offi-
cials said.”). 
 115. See COVID-19 Vaccine EUA Letter of Authorization Letter from Food 
& Drug Admin. to Pfizer (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/me-
dia/144412/download (reissuing EUA for Pfizer vaccine first issued on Decem-
ber 11, 2020). 
 116. See COVID-19 Vaccine EUA Letter of Authorization Letter from Food 
& Drug Admin. to Moderna (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/me-
dia/144636/download (authorizing emergency use of Moderna vaccine). 
 117. See JUNE FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1–19 (laying out the FDA’s 
expectations for preclinical data and clinical trial design); see also OCTOBER 
FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 1–11 (providing more specifics on data ex-
pected to obtain an EUA, logistical considerations, and information on the 
VRBPAC). 
 118. October FDA Guidance, supra note 2, at 9. 
 119. See FDA, Pfizer-Biontech Covid-19 Vaccine (Bnt162, Pf-07302048) Vac-
cines And Related Biological Products Advisory Committee Briefing Document 
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/144246/download [hereinafter 
Pfizer-Biontech Briefing] (containing Pfizer’s submission to the FDA advisory 
committee presenting clinical trial results); see also FDA, FDA Briefing Docu-
ment Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/me-
dia/144434/download [hereinafter Moderna Briefing] (containing Moderna’s 
submission to the FDA advisory committee presenting clinical trial results). 
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safety and efficacy for Pfizer120 and Moderna121 vaccines. The 
FDA also stated it intended to consult with the Vaccines and Re-
lated Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC)122 to 
 
 120. See PFIZER-BIONTECH BRIEFING, supra note 119, at 53 (“Based on 
Phase 3 data from approximately 38,000 participants with a median of 2 months 
of follow-up after Dose 2 in Study C4591001, BNT162b2 at 30 µg was safe and 
well-tolerated in participants ≥16 years of age. Reactogenicity and AEs were 
generally milder and less frequent in participants in the older group (≥56 years 
of age) compared with the younger group (≤55 years of age). Reactogenicity was 
mostly mild to moderate and short-lived after dosing for both adult age groups 
and for younger adolescents 12 to 15 years of age (whose preliminary data pro-
vide support to ≥16 years of age indication), and the AE profile did not suggest 
any serious safety concerns. The incidence of SAEs and deaths were low in the 
context of the number of participants enrolled and comparable for BNT162b2 
and placebo. The incidence of discontinuations due to AEs was also generally 
low and similar between BNT162b2 and placebo groups. This profile was con-
sistent for the subset of approximately 19,000 participants who had at least 2 
months of follow-up after Dose 2.”); id. at 54 (“VE [(efficacy)] of BNT162b2 was 
95.5% with a 99.99% posterior probability for the true VE being >30% condi-
tioning on available data, to overwhelmingly meet the prespecified interim 
analysis success criterion (>99.5%). The 95% credible interval for the VE was 
88.8% to 98.4%, indicating that given these observed data there was a 95% prob-
ability that the true VE lies in this interval. Also, note that the posterior prob-
ability that true VE >86.0% is 99.5% and VE >88.8% is 97.5%.”). See generally 
Fernando P. Polack et al., Safety and Efficacy of the BNT162b2 mRNA Covid-
19 Vaccine, 383 N. ENG. J. MED. 2603, 2603–2615 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2034577 (reviewing Pfizer clinical trial data in 
a publication). 
 121. See MODERNA BRIEFING, supra note 119, at 50 (“The vaccine elicited 
increased local and systemic adverse reactions as compared to those in the pla-
cebo arm, usually lasting a few days. The most common solicited adverse reac-
tions were pain at injection site (91.6%), fatigue (68.5%), headache (63.0%), 
muscle pain (59.6%), joint pain (44.8%), and chills (43.4%). Adverse reactions 
characterized as reactogenicity were generally mild to moderate; 0.2% to 9.7% 
of these events were reported as severe, with severe solicited adverse reactions 
being more frequent after dose 2 than after dose 1 and generally less frequent 
in older adults (≥65 years of age) as compared to younger participants . . . . Se-
rious adverse events, while uncommon (1.0% in both treatment groups), repre-
sented medical events that occur in the general population at similar frequency 
as observed in the study.”); id. at 23 (“[I]n participants ≥18 years of age, there 
were 5 COVID-19 cases in the vaccine group and 90 COVID-19 cases in the 
placebo group, with a VE of 94.5%, a lower bound of the 95% CI of 86.5%, and a 
one-sided p-value of <0.0001 for testing H0: VE ≤30%, which met the pre-speci-
fied success criterion. In participants ≥65 years of age in the Per-Protocol Set, 
there were no COVID-19 cases in the vaccine group and 15 COVID-19 cases in 
the placebo group.”). 
 122. Charter of the Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Com-
mittee, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/advisory-commit-
tees/vaccines-and-related-biological-products-advisory-committee/charter-vac-
cines-and-related-biological-products-advisory-committee (last visited Jan. 6, 
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discuss safety and efficacy prior to issuing any EUA.123 Prior to 
the issuance of either EUA, VRBPAC met and voted to advise 
the FDA to authorize both the Pfizer124 and Moderna125 vaccines 
after reviewing sponsor submissions.126 A CDC advisory commit-
tee, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
(ACIP)127 also reviewed available data and recommended the use 
of both the Pfizer128 and Moderna129 vaccines. 
 
2021) (establishing the CRBPAC as a committee of independent scientific ex-
perts who “review[] and evaluate[] data concerning the safety, effectiveness, and 
appropriate use of vaccines and related biological products which are intended 
for use in the prevention, treatment, or diagnosis of human diseases, and, as 
required, any other products for which the (FDA) has regulatory responsibil-
ity . . . ” in order to give recommendations to the FDA Commissioner). 
 123. See OCTOBER FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 11 (“FDA expects to con-
vene an open session of FDA’s VRBPAC prior to the issuance of any EUA for a 
COVID-19 vaccine, to discuss whether the available safety and effectiveness 
data support authorization of an EUA for the specific request under review.”). 
 124. FDA, Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee, 
YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2020), https://youtu.be/owveMJBTc2I?t=31168 (voting 17-4-
1 to authorize the Pfizer vaccine for those sixteen and older and discussing con-
cerns whether there was sufficient data to authorize for those under age eight-
een). 
 125. FDA, Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee, 
YouTube (Dec. 17, 2020), https://youtu.be/I4psAfbUtC0?t=29075 (voting 20-0-1 
to authorize the Moderna vaccine for those eighteen and older). 
 126. See PFIZER-BIONTECH BRIEFING, supra note 119; see also MODERNA 
BRIEFING, supra note 119. 
 127. See ACIP Charter, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/charter.html (last visited Jan. 6, 
2021) (“The ACIP shall provide advice and guidance to the Director of the CDC 
regarding use of vaccines and related agents for effective control of vaccine-pre-
ventable diseases in the civilian population of the United States. Recommenda-
tions made by the ACIP are reviewed by the CDC Director, and if adopted, are 
published as official CDC/HHS recommendations in the Morbidity and Mortal-
ity Weekly Report (MMWR).”). 
 128. See Sara E. Oliver et al., U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ Interim Recommendation 
for Use of Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine — United States, December 
2020, 69 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., 1922, 1922–1924 (2020) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6950e2 (“On December 12, 2020, after an 
explicit, evidence-based review of all available data, the Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation for use of 
the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥16 years for the pre-
vention of COVID-19.”). 
 129. See Sara E. Oliver et al., U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices’ Interim Recommendation 
for Use of Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine — United States, December 2020, 69 
Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., 1653, 1653–1656 (2021) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm695152e1 (“On December 19, 2020, after a 
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Underserved communities have expressed concerns that 
they may be used as test subjects for a vaccine not yet proven 
safe.130 Commentators have begun to ring alarm bells: “[w]ithout 
a clear, transparent, and scientifically sound decision-making 
process, the trust the FDA has built and maintained over the 
past century is eroding.”131 Scientists and the public at large ex-
pressed concern that a vaccine would be approved for political, 
rather than scientific reasons.132 The perception that a SARS-
CoV-2 vaccine was approved for political reasons might increase 
vaccine hesitancy for the instant vaccine,133 but also for vaccines 
 
transparent, evidence-based review of available data, the Advisory Committee 
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) issued an interim recommendation for use 
of the Moderna COVID-19 vaccine in persons aged ≥18 years for the prevention 
of COVID-19.”). 
 130. See Laurel Wamsley, Researchers Find Doubts About COVID-19 Vac-
cine Among People of Color, NPR (Oct. 22, 2020 5:07 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-up-
dates/2020/10/22/926813331/researchers-find-doubts-about-covid-19-vaccine-
among-people-of-color (“Participants [in listening sessions] also expressed fears 
based on past experiences. One person expressed a worry that ‘this is an-
other Tuskegee experiment.’”). 
 131. Baden et al., supra note 1; see also Thomson & Nachlis, supra note 1, 
at 1282 (“[P]roblems include the authorization of potentially ineffective or un-
safe therapeutics, the appearance of nonexpert political advocacy generating 
public pressure for product authorizations with questionable safety and effi-
cacy, and the imposition of significant costs on the health of the public and on 
the credibility and influence of . . . FDA.”). 
 132. See Smriti Mallapaty & Heidi Ledford, COVID-Vaccine Results Are on 
the Way — and Scientists’ Concerns Are Growing, 586 NATURE, 16, 16–17 
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-02706-6 (“Researchers warn that 
vaccines could stumble on safety trials, be fast-tracked because of politics or fail 
to meet the public’s expectations.”); see also Jan Hoffman, Mistrust of a Corona-
virus Vaccine Could Imperil Widespread Immunity, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/18/health/coronavirus-anti-vaccine.html 
(“Billions are being poured into developing a shot, but the rapid timetable and 
President Trump’s cheerleading are creating a whole new group of vaccine-hes-
itant patients.”); Albert Ko & Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Amid Vaccine Trials, the FDA 
is on Trial Itself, FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2020 3:01 PM), https://for-
tune.com/2020/09/24/fda-covid-vaccine-trump-meddling/ (“[O]ur country’s core 
health institutions have suffered repeated controversies, reversals, and misin-
terpretation of evidence, which, in turn, have eroded the public’s confidence.”). 
But see Scott Gottlieb & Mark McClellan, You Can Trust the FDA’s Vaccine 
Process, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2020 4:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/you-
can-trust-the-fdas-vaccine-process-11600633351 (“We reject the claim that a 
vaccine EUA inherently falls short of FDA’s gold standard review, or that the 
process will be hijacked.”). 
 133. Cf. Roy M. Anderson et al., Challenges in Creating Herd Immunity to 
SARS-CoV-2 Infection by Mass Vaccination, 396 LANCET 1614, 1614–1616 
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more broadly.134 Some have suggested that the FDA should be 
disentangled from the political thicket by making it an inde-
pendent agency.135 Others have argued the FDA should avoid 
the EUA process entirely in the context of SARS-CoV-2 to pre-
serve intuitional credibility and ensure the vaccines are fully 
vetted.136 
The events of the COVID-19 crisis demonstrate how ill-
suited the current EUA structure is at responding to emerging 
diseases in the modern era. The EUA process is reliant on exec-
utive branch norms that have already been broken.137 In the con-
text of vaccines for emerging disease, a lack of trust in the FDA 
 
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)32318-7 (“Given vaccine hesi-
tancy, the creation of herd immunity by vaccination is likely to be challenging 
in many countries.”); see also Patrick Peretti-Watel et al., A Future Vaccination 
Campaign Against COVID-19 at Risk of Vaccine Hesitancy and Politicisation, 
20 LANCET INFECT. DIS. 769, 769–770 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-
3099(20)30426-6 (arguing that politics becoming intertwined with vaccination 
reduces vaccination rates). 
 134. See Brit Trogen, David Oshinsky & Arthur Caplan, Adverse Conse-
quences of Rushing a SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine: Implications for Public Trust, 323 
JAMA 2460, 2461 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.8917 (“Failing to 
abide by standards of safety and scientific rigor during the COVID-19 crisis will 
fuel the argument that physicians and scientists cannot be trusted. Vaccination 
rates, which are declining due to widespread concern about visiting clinicians’ 
offices, could further decrease. The US could see resurgences of many vaccine-
preventable illnesses, and inevitably, massive increases in avoidable deaths and 
irreversible outcomes.”). 
 135. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Is It Time for the FDA to Be Independent?, 
STAT (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/03/should-fda-be-inde-
pendent/ (“To create an FDA independent of the HHS secretary, the public’s 
representatives in Congress—and the president—need to change the govern-
ance of the FDA. As a first step, the laws governing the FDA’s authorization of 
drugs and vaccines could be changed to make the FDA commissioner the deci-
sion maker, rather than the HHS secretary. Congress could also add more spe-
cific criteria for issuing an emergency use authorization for a vaccine or drug—
criteria already exist for approval of both drugs (which must be ‘safe and effec-
tive’) and vaccines (which must be ‘safe, pure, potent and effective’).”). 
 136. See Matthew W. McCarthy et al., Make Pre-Approval Covid-19 Vaccines 
Available Through Expanded Access, Not an EUA, STAT (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/09/expanded-access-not-eua-for-distrib-
uting-preapproval-covid-19-vaccines/ (arguing “an emergency use authorization 
for Covid-19 vaccines at this stage of development would not require careful 
reporting of adverse events and could potentially undermine ongoing and future 
clinical trials that are still necessary to determine safety and efficacy” among 
other concerns). 
 137. The Trump presidency put a glaring spotlight on outsized political in-
fluence in decisions of great national importance, but this is not a modern phe-
nomenon. The historian Rick Atkinson argues that in July 1942 President Roo-
sevelt pressured his generals to bring “U.S. ground troops . . . into action 
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threatens to fundamentally undermine the FDA’s public health 
mandate. Congress and the FDA need to formalize the emerging 
infectious disease vaccine EUA process to more accurately re-
flect the regulatory reality, but also to restore public trust in the 
agency and future vaccines. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE EVENTS SURROUNDING HCQ DEMONSTRATE THE 
FAILURE OF THE EUA PROCESS 
The EUA issued for chloroquine phosphate (CQ) and hy-
droxychloroquine sulfate (HCQ)138 and subsequent revocation139 
were marred by scandal with the unproven therapies being ini-
tially touted as a cure by the President on Twitter140 followed by 
apparent direct interference in the regulatory process.141 It is 
critical to note that the HCQ and CQ EUA met the minimal legal 
bar set by 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c): 
(1) [SARS-CoV-2] can cause a serious or life-threatening disease or con-
dition; (2) that, based on the totality of scientific evidence available to 
the Secretary, including data from adequate and well-controlled clini-
cal trials, if available, it is reasonable to believe that— (A) the product 
may be effective in diagnosing, treating, or preventing . . . [SARS-CoV-
2 and] (B) the known and potential benefits of the product when used 
to . . . treat [SARS-CoV-2] outweigh the known and potential risks of 
the product . . . (3) that there is no adequate, approved, and available 
 
against the enemy in 1942” partly in response to an upcoming midterm election 
in which Roosevelt expected to fare poorly. RICK ATKINSON, AN ARMY AT DAWN: 
THE WAR IN NORTH AFRICA, 1942-1943 15 (2002) (quoting Franklin D. Roose-
velt). Atkinson goes on to argue that this pressure contributed to an Allied in-
vasion of North Africa. See id. at 16. A president could take a less conspicuous 
approach to pressuring the FDA—applying the same amount of politically-mo-
tivated pressure, but in a less public manner—and such an approach arguably 
would have been much more damaging to public health. 
 138. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 91 (authorizing emergency 
use of HCQ and CQ). 
 139. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 98 (revoking emergency use 
of HCQ and CQ). 
 140. See Cathey, supra note 88 (“Trump tweets to his roughly 84 million fol-
lowers that hydroxychloroquine taken with the antibiotic azithromycin could be 
‘one of the biggest game changers in the history of medicine’ and should ‘be put 
in use immediately.’”). 
 141. See Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, supra note 95 (describing 
the firing of Dr. Rick Bright who claimed to have been fired in part because he 
opposed the approval of HCQ and CQ). 
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alternative to the product for diagnosing, preventing, or treating such 
disease or condition . . . .142 
There is no dispute that SARS-CoV-2 “can cause a serious 
disease or condition” and there was no “adequate, approved, and 
available alternative” treatment.143 After meeting these two re-
quirements, the authorization threshold set by § 360bbb-3(c)(2) 
is effectively nonexistent: “the product may be effective in diag-
nosing, treating, or preventing” the disease “based on the total-
ity of scientific evidence available to the Secretary . . . .”144 In the 
context of an emerging infectious disease there may never be 
sufficient scientific evidence to make a considered approval de-
cision, implying that an EUA could issue in light of minimal sci-
entific evidence. That is precisely what happened with HCQ and 
CQ; the available evidence was a low-power, unblinded prelimi-
nary clinical trial145 and in vitro experiments.146 
 
 142. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c) (emphasis added); see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., supra note 91 at 3. 
 143. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c) (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. (emphasis added). 
 145. See Gautret et al., supra note 89 (reporting an “open-label non-random-
ized clinical trial” with 20 total cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection). 
 146. See Yao et al., supra note 90 at 732 (measuring the pharmokinetics of 
HCQ and CQ in SARS-CoV-2 infected vero cells); see also Wang et al., supra 
note 90, at 270 (measuring viral replication in vero cells treated with CQ). Iron-
ically as scientific understanding of the mechanism of HCQ in inhibiting SARS-
CoV-2 replication in vitro progressed it became clear that HCQ might actually 
inhibit viral entry into host cells if combined with another drug, Camostat. 
Tianling Ou et al., Hydroxychloroquine-Mediated Inhibition of SARS-CoV-2 En-
try Is Attenuated by TMPRSS2., 17 PLOS PATHOG. e1009212, 3 (2021) (showing 
that SARS-CoV-2 entry can be mediated by two distinct proteins; HCQ inhibits 
only one of these proteins but the other can be inhibited by the drug Camostat). 
This research implied that HCQ may have had potential as a SARS-CoV-2 ther-
apy if used in conjunction with Camostat. Id. Clinical trials were started in 2020 
to test this combination therapy, but they were cancelled prior to the publica-
tion of the aforementioned research in part because the control arm used HCQ 
alone and it became clear that HCQ alone had no clinical benefit. See COMBINA-
TION THERAPY WITH CAMOSTAT MESILATE + HYDROXYCHLOROQUINE FOR 
COVID-19 (CLOCC), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT04338906 (last up-
dated Dec. 21, 2020) (“Withdrawn (lack of public funding; planned control arm 
with Hydroxychloroquine treatment showed out as not being standard of care 
anymore as time evolved.)”). See generally This Week in Virology, Fauci Ouchy, 
MICROBE.TV, at 3:58 (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.microbe.tv/twiv/twiv-715/ (re-
viewing and synthesizing this research on a hypothetical combination HCQ 
Camostat therapy). If the authorization of HCQ had not been so rushed perhaps 
there would have been time for the scientific understanding of its mechanism 
of action to mature to the point where it could have been used as a successful 
therapy. However, this seems unlikely now given the political baggage associ-
ated with the drug. 
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The events of the HCQ EUA lead to two distinct harms. 
Firstly, the March EUA was followed by a substantial increase 
in use of HCQ,147 but a safety profile was not fully established 
until much later in the year.148 Later evidence showed HCQ was 
unsafe in a subset of patients,149 implying that medical harm 
was a real possibility. Secondly, and perhaps more pernicious, is 
the degree to which premature statements on a drug’s effective-
ness have undermined public faith in the FDA as an institution. 
The media have rightly highlighted these breaches of norms but 
have done so at the expense of informing the public about other 
public health information, such as the safety of vaccines in de-
velopment.150 Flagging public trust in the FDA has compounded 
fears that vaccine hesitancy151 will slow uptake of a vaccine 
which is safe and effective.152 If members of the public are un-
willing to get a safe and effective vaccine it will be difficult or 
impossible to achieve vaccine-induced herd immunity and 
SARS-CoV-2 will continue exacting its toll on the public.153 
 
 147. See Bull-Otterson et al., supra note 92 (tracking new and continuing 
prescriptions of HCQ and CQ). 
 148. See Lofgren et al., supra note 96, at 1 (finding no evidence of safety 
issues with short term use of HCQ). 
 149. Lane et al., supra note 100, at 1 (finding a heart risk to long term use 
of HCQ or short-term use of HCQ in concert with azithromycin). 
 150. See Sacerdote et al., supra note 93, at 12 (“[W]e show results for men-
tions of COVID-19 vaccines and any names of the top ten institutions or com-
panies working on a COVID-19 vaccine. The U.S. major outlets ran 1,371 such 
stories. During the same period they ran 8,756 stories involving Trump and 
mask wearing and 1,636 stories about Trump and hydroxychloroquine.”). 
 151. See generally Smith, supra note 110 (reviewing factors that contribute 
to vaccine hesitancy). 
 152. See Kreps et al., supra note 41, at 6 (“Political attributes were also as-
sociated with vaccine choice. An FDA EUA was associated with a lower proba-
bility of choosing a vaccine (coefficient, −0.03; 95% CI, −0.04 to −0.01) compared 
with a full FDA approval . . . . Compared with an endorsement from President 
Trump, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and World Health Organi-
zation endorsements were associated with higher probabilities of choosing the 
vaccine (coefficient, 0.09 [95% CI, 0.07-0.11] vs 0.06 [95% CI, 0.04-0.08]).”); see 
also Hoffman, supra note 132 (“A growing number of polls find so many people 
saying they would not get a coronavirus vaccine that its potential to shut down 
the pandemic could be in jeopardy. Distrust of it is particularly pronounced in 
African-American communities, which have been disproportionately devastated 
by the virus. But even many staunch supporters of immunization say they are 
wary of this vaccine.”). 
 153. See Mallory et al., supra note 36, at 64 (explaining the concept of vac-
cination induced herd immunity); see also Aschwanden, supra note 38, at 26–
28 (reviewing estimates of the vaccination rates necessary to achieve vaccina-
tion induced herd immunity). 
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The hypothetical where an untested vaccine receives an 
EUA is not unfounded. The statutory standard for a vaccine 
EUA is the standard that was employed for HCQ. This implies a 
vaccine EUA could theoretically have issued supported by com-
parably minimal scientific evidence. The only thing preventing 
a premature EUA from issuing in the context of SARS-CoV-2 
vaccine was institutional inertia and norms, and these could 
have been overcome by a series of firings,154 a real possibility in 
the context of the events surrounding SARS-CoV-2.155 It is lucky 
that in this instance, the scientific consensus indicates that the 
Pfizer and Moderna vaccines are safe and effective.156 In large 
part this is a result of the FDA using its institutional fiat to en-
force a higher standard of safety review than is required by 35 
U.S.C. § 360bbb-3.157 The events surrounding HCQ EUA have 
severely undermined the institutional credibility of the FDA. 
Had similar events accompanied a vaccine EUA, the potential 
for harm could only have been magnified. Reform is therefore 
needed to allow the agency to rebuild public trust and withstand 
political pressure. 
 
 154. See Reiss, supra note 135 (“The HHS secretary oversees the FDA com-
missioner and is the one responsible (and, by implication, in charge). Both the 
FDA commissioner and the HHS secretary are removable at will by the presi-
dent. Removing either because the president dislikes their policy choices is le-
gal, if not always politically or substantively wise.”). 
 155. See Lemire et al., supra note 114 (“Hours before the Food and Drug 
Administration authorized the first COVD-19 vaccine late Friday, a high-rank-
ing White House official told the agency’s chief he could face firing if the vaccine 
was not cleared by day’s end . . . .”). 
 156. See PFIZER-BIONTECH BRIEFING, supra note 119 (providing data used 
by FDA to authorize Pfizer vaccine); see also MODERNA BRIEFING, supra note 
119 (providing data used by FDA to authorize Moderna vaccine); Polack et al., 
supra note 120 (publishing Pfizer clinical trial data); Oliver et al., supra note 
128 (providing ACIP’s endorsement of Pfizer vaccine); Oliver et al., supra note 
129 (providing ACIP’s endorsement of Moderna vaccine). 
 157. See OCTOBER FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2 (indicating that the FDA 
was willing to issue an authorization following an interim analysis of a phase 
III clinical trial at the earliest). Phase I and II vaccine clinical trials typically 
focus on obtaining safety data while phase III trials are more focused on efficacy 
data. See Michael G Hudgens et al., Endpoints in vaccine trials., 13 STAT. METH-
ODS MED. RES. 89, 89 (2004) https://doi.org/10.1191/0962280204sm356ra (“For 
vaccine candidates that are safe and immunogenic in Phase I and II trials, 
Phase III trials (n ~ 1000–100 000) are employed to evaluate efficacy of the vac-
cine within the population of interest. Vaccines that prove to be safe and effica-
cious in Phase III trials may be licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency.”). 
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B. A NEW EUA PATHWAY FOR VACCINES 
i. The Origins of the Existing EUA Standard Make it Unsuited 
for Public Health 
The fundamental balance of safety and efficacy underlying 
the EUA process was codified in response to national security 
concerns,158 and originally intended to be used only in the con-
text of military operations.159 The legal standards for authoriza-
tion160 remain unchanged and the legislature has simply added 
provisions allowing EUAs to be used in the context of public 
health emergencies tacked on.161 
The legal standard for approval of a vaccine developed in 
response to a public health crisis should be higher than the 
standard for a product intended for emergency use in the context 
of a military operation. While one can draw colorable analogies 
between the pandemic and a state of war,162 the public health 
response to an emerging disease presents fundamentally differ-
ent challenge than a military adversary. Military adversaries 
 
 158. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, supra 
note 49 at § 1603 (permitting an EUA only after a declaration by the “Secretary 
of Defense that there is a military emergency, or a significant potential for a 
military emergency, involving a heightened risk to United States military forces 
of attack with a specified biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent or 
agents.”). 
 159. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-106, at 361 (contending that this EUAs are 
meant to be used in conditions “identical to those current in effect under section 
731(a) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act”); see also 
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, su-
pra note 50, at § 731(a) (establishing a “Process for Waiving Informed Consent 
Requirement for Administration of Certain Drugs to Members of Armed Forces 
for Purposes of a Particular Military Operation”). 
 160. “[B]ased on the totality of scientific evidence available to the Secretary, 
including data from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials, if available, it 
is reasonable to believe that– (A) the product may be effective in diagnosing, 
treating, or preventing– (i) such disease or condition . . . [and] (B) the known 
and potential benefits of the product, when used to diagnose, prevent, or treat 
such disease or condition, outweigh the known and potential risks of the prod-
uct . . . .” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, supra note 
49 at § 1603; see also 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(e) (containing the same language). 
 161. See Project Bioshield Act of 2004, supra note 51, at § 4 (adding public 
health emergency declarations to 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3). 
 162. E.g., Taylor Swift, Folklore (Republic Records 2020) (analogizing a med-
ical worker in the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic to a solider storming the beach in the 
track “epiphany”). 
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are responsive to persuasion and politics.163 By contrast a virus 
obeys an evolutionary imperative; a virus cannot be bargained 
with or convinced to take a different course of action.164 Unlike 
the traditional conception of a war, public health does not have 
a beginning and an end.165 In the context of the SARS-CoV-2 
pandemic a solution such as a vaccine mandate might seem com-
pelling to a politician if it appears that the politician is directly 
addressing the problem in the short term.166 Scientists and phy-
sicians are divided on whether such a mandate would be helpful, 
however, or whether a more nuanced solution would be more ef-
fective for public health both in the short and long term.167 The 
 
 163. The military theorist Carl von Clausewitz famously argued “War is 
nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other 
means. We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain at the 
same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the War itself, is not 
changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to 
exist, whatever may be the form of the means which it uses . . . .” CARL VON 
CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 123 (James John Graham trans., N. Trübner & Company 
1873) (1832), https://www.google.com/books/edition/On_War/PQY4AQAA-
MAAJ. 
 164. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 278 (Signet Classics 
2003) (1859) (arguing that the instinctual actions of living organisms are 
“not . . . specially endowed or created instincts, but . . . small consequences of 
one general law leading to the advancement of all organic begins,—namely, 
multiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die.”); see also Jeffery K 
Taubenberger & John C Kash, Influenza Virus Evolution, Host Adaptation, and 
Pandemic Formation, 7 CELL HOST MICROBE 440, 440–451 (2010), https://pub-
med.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20542248 (reviewing evolution in the context of influenza 
viruses). 
 165. For example, consider the yearly influenza vaccine. It is necessary to 
vaccinate as many people as possible every year to achieve the optimal public 
health outcome, and this will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. 
See generally Greenwood, supra note 32 (reviewing the history and predictions 
for the future of vaccines). An action which yields short-term political benefits 
in an influenza outbreak such as a vaccine mandate or a temporary lockdown 
may do nothing to address the long-term issue of influenza vaccination rates in 
the future and may actually harm public health if the short-term political action 
is taken at the expense of public trust in public health institutions. 
 166. See generally BRYDEN SPURLING, THE PERIL OF MODERN DEMOCRACY: 
SHORT-TERM THINKING IN A LONG-TERM WORLD, 1–9 (United States Studies 
Centre, 2020), https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/the-peril-of-modern-democ-
racy-short-term-thinking-in-a-long-term-world (discussing the issue of short-
term incentives in liberal democracies). 
 167. See Liam Drew, The Case for Mandatory Vaccination 575 NATURE S58, 
S58–S60 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-03642-w (reporting on the 
scientific debate around mandatory vaccination). The example of mandatory 
vaccination is presented as an illustrative example, but resolution of this issue 
is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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incentives structure of war is fundamentally political,168 and po-
litical incentives structures do not produce optimal public health 
outcomes because public health must necessarily prioritize long 
term solutions. Another concrete example of the distinction be-
tween warfare and public health is the value of transparency.169 
In national security, secrecy is often paramount to achieving a 
favorable policy outcome.170 By contrast, secrecy is often coun-
terproductive in public health. There is no reason not to publish 
the ingredients in an authorized vaccine and clinical trial data; 
viruses cannot read. In practice secrecy can undermine trust in 
public health and by implication policy outcomes, such as achiev-
ing a high vaccination rate.171 
Because achieving vaccine-induced herd immunity172 repre-
sents the clearest resolution to a pandemic disease173 convincing 
people to get the vaccine remains the keystone component to the 
response to an emerging infectious disease.174 Vaccine hesitancy 
already represents a challenge to achieving vaccine-induced 
herd immunity175 and a statutory standard that does not adopt 
a rigorous safety standard will only reinforce vaccine hesitancy. 
First, the current standard has already contributed to a deficit 
of trust in the FDA as an institution. The highly deferential 
standard for obtaining an EUA certainly contributed to the 
events surrounding HCQ and the subsequent loss of faith in the 
 
 168. See VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 163, at 123 (theorizing war is funda-
mentally a political action). 
 169. See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Digital Disease Surveillance 70 AM. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=3698431 (discussing the implication of transparency in a pandemic as 
opposed to national security). 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See generally Randolph & Barreiro, supra note 6, at 737 (explaining the 
concept of herd immunity in the context of SARS-CoV-2). 
 173. See van Riel & de Wit, supra note 31, at 810 (“Consensus among experts 
is that only an effective COVID-19 vaccine will end the pandemic.”). 
 174. See Anderson et al., supra note 133, at 1616 (“Given vaccine hesitancy, 
the creation of herd immunity by vaccination is likely to be challenging in many 
countries.”); see also Peretti-Watel et al., supra note 133, at 769–770 (arguing 
that politics becoming intertwined with vaccination reduces vaccination rates). 
 175. See Smith, supra note 110 (explaining vaccine hesitancy). 
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FDA.176 Second, the current standard can support misinfor-
mation. Skeptics of a vaccine could cite the text of 21 U.S.C. § 
360bbb-3 to argue that the standard for authorization was min-
imal to nonexistent and that such a vaccine was therefore not 
proven safe. People who look to the statutory standard therefore 
may hesitate to trust the vaccines, even though the FDA adopted 
a more rigorous standard for each of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccines 
that received EUAs.177 Third, legal standards should reflect so-
cial norms.178 The actions of vaccine manufacturers179 and the 
public at large180 in the course of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic re-
flect a social norm that vaccines be proven safe prior to being 
employed by the public. While it is true that in in the course of 
the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic the FDA used its own institutional 
clout to ensure that the standard for authorization reflected 
these norms,181 as the events surrounding HCQ demonstrate 
there is no guarantee that scientific judgment, rather than poli-
tics, will always win the day. Fourth and finally, the cost paid in 
institutional trust by the FDA does not only affect the instant 
 
 176. See Baden et al., supra note 1 (discussing erosion of trust at the FDA) 
see also Thomson & Nachlis, supra note 1, at 1282 (citing events surrounding 
HCQ as one reason for loss of trust in the FDA). 
 177. See OCTOBER FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2 (indicating that the FDA 
was willing to issue an authorization following an interim analysis of a phase 
III clinical trial at the earliest). 
 178. See generally Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples 
Obey the Law, 4 REV. LAW & ECON. 715 (2008) (analyzing the impact of social 
norms on legal compliance). 
 179. See Biopharma Leaders Unite To Stand With Science, supra note 112 
(reporting on the vaccine manufacturer pledge to “[o]nly submit for approval or 
emergency use authorization after demonstrating safety and efficacy through a 
Phase 3 clinical study that is designed and conducted to meet requirements of 
expert regulatory authorities such as FDA.”). 
 180. See Tyson et al., supra note 110 (polling a decline in individuals who 
would get a hypothetical vaccine after concerns about an expedited vaccine ap-
proval process emerged); see also O’Keefe, supra note 110 (polling finding the 
same decline in individuals willing to receive a hypothetical vaccine). 
 181. The FDA stuck to requiring the level of evidence and process it indi-
cated it would require following its initial process. See OCTOBER FDA GUID-
ANCE, supra note 2 (indicating the FDA was willing to issue an EUA following 
an interim analysis of a phase III clinical trial at the earliest); see also PFIZER-
BIONTECH BRIEFING, supra note 119 (containing the aforementioned phase III 
interim analysis for the Pfizer vaccine); MODERNA BRIEFING, supra note 119 
(containing the aforementioned phase III interim analysis for the Moderna vac-
cine). This was despite repeated instances of political pressure on the agency to 
approve a vaccine sooner. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 106 (reporting on the 
administration’s statements that a vaccine would be approved before the 2020 
Presidential election). 
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vaccine, but also public trust in vaccinations more broadly which 
adversely affects public health outcomes.182 
ii. The Proposed Emergency Infectious Diseases Vaccine EUA 
Pathway 
Congress should therefore codify a distinct emergency ap-
proval pathway for vaccines developed in response to emerging 
infectious diseases.183 The proposed emerging infectious disease 
vaccine EUA would parallel the existing EUA structure but 
would be entirely independent of the existing statutory frame-
work of 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3. The proposed framework is pre-
sented in Appendix I of this Note. The language presented bor-
rows heavily from the existing text of title 21 but is intended as 
a framework, not proposed statutory text.184 
The proposed emerging infectious disease vaccine EUA 
should be reliant on an emergency declaration distinct from the 
traditional EUA process while leaving the traditional EUA pro-
cess fundamentally intact. One could argue that an emerging 
disease pandemic does not meet the legal standard set by § 
360bbb-3(b)(1)(C).185 The creation of a separate authorization 
 
 182. Cf. Peeples, supra note 42 (“In January, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) listed ‘vaccine hesitancy’, which describes the reluctance or refusal to 
vaccinate despite the availability of vaccines, among the top ten global health 
threats in 2019.”). 
 183. There is an argument that such a distinct emergency approval pathway 
should apply to any therapeutic developed in response to a pandemic, but this 
Note will be limited to arguing for a pathway for vaccines in particular because 
concerns about safety are fundamentally linked to the public health outcomes 
for vaccines in a unique way in light of vaccine hesitancy and the widespread 
use of vaccines in healthy individuals. 
 184. For instance the framework presented in Appendix I does not discuss a 
mechanism for terminating the emerging infectious disease vaccine EUA. For 
the sake of clarity and focus this Note focuses only on the legal standards for 
the initial authorization, but the existing EUA framework provides a roadmap 
that would be informative for many other situations, including how EUAs are 
to terminate. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(2) (“Termination of declaration”). 
 185. “[D]etermination by the Secretary that there is a public health emer-
gency, or a significant potential for a public health emergency, that affects, or 
has a significant potential to affect, national security or the health and security 
of United States citizens living abroad, and that involves a biological, chemical, 
radiological, or nuclear agent or agents, or a disease or condition that may be 
attributable to such agent or agents . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(C) (em-
phasis added). A hypothetical argument could be that in light of the legislative 
history of § 360bbb-3 such national security concerns are limited to active troop 
deployments and EUAs should therefore be limited to military personal. See 
H.R. REP. NO. 108-106, at 361 (contending that this EUAs are meant to be used 
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pathway would make it clear that the current EUA process is 
meant to be reserved for traditional national security threats 
while simultaneously preserving the current deferential EUA 
process if such circumstances arise.186 This presumption will be 
reinforced by modifying the initial 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(A-
D) emergency declaration to require a finding that the emer-
gency cannot be addressed under the proposed emerging infec-
tious disease vaccine EUA, to ensure that the proposed pathway 
 
in conditions “identical to those current in effect under section 731(a) of the 
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act”); see also Strom Thur-
mond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, supra note 50, 
at § 731(a) (establishing a “Process for Waiving Informed Consent Requirement 
for Administration of Certain Drugs to Members of Armed Forces for Purposes 
of a Particular Military Operation”); McCarthy et al., supra note 55 (arguing 
that EUA should not be used for pandemics as a policy matter). This argument 
does not seem particularly convincing because § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(C) was added as 
a distinct emergency declaration from § 360bbb-3(b)(1)(B) which concerns mili-
tary emergencies, but congress could endorse a reading where the traditional 
EUA pathway was reserved only for the most serious emergencies by slightly 
amending §360bbb-3(b)(1)(C) to make this clear. 
 186. For instance, the traditional EUA process would undoubtedly be more 
appropriate in the event of a bioterrorism attack. The 1918 influenza pandemic 
presents another circumstance where a traditional EUA might be appropriate, 
given that the United States was participating in World War I. See generally 
Carol R Byerly, The U.S. Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919, 
125 Suppl 3 PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 82, 82–91 (2010), https://pub-
med.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/20568570 (discussing the intersection of the 1918 pan-
demic and the war). There is a more difficult question of whether existing 
emerging infectious diseases that present with at least an order of magnitude 
higher mortality burden such as Ebola, Marburg, and Nipah. See Adam J. Ku-
charski & W. John Edmunds, Case Fatality Rate for Ebola Virus Disease in West 
Africa, 384 LANCET 1260, 1260 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(14)61706-2 (reporting Ebola case fatality rates ranging from 50 to 70% 
depending on the outbreak and methodology); see also Kyle Shifflett & Andrea 
Marzi, Marburg Virus Pathogenesis – Differences and Dimilarities in Humans 
and Animal Models, 16 VIROLOGY J. 165 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12985-
019-1272-z (reporting Marburg “case fatality rate ranging from 23 to 90%, de-
pending on the outbreak . . . ”); Aditi & Malini Shariff, Nipah Virus Infection: A 
Review, 147 EPIDEMIOLOGY INFECTION 1, 2 (2019), 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0950268819000086 (reporting Nipah morality ranging 
from 40 to 70% depending on the outbreak). These dwarf the mortality rate for 
SARS-CoV-2. See Meyerowitz-Katz & Merone, supra note 20 (estimating an IFR 
of 0.68%); see also Yang et al., supra note 20 (estimating a CFR of 1.39%). It is 
likely if there was a widespread outbreak of Ebola, Marburg, or Nipah the high 
mortality rate would necessitate the use of a traditional EUA, another reason 
to leave the traditional EUA process relatively intact. Emerging infectious dis-
ease with a mortality rates over 50% are also more amicable to characterization 
as national security threats. 
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is explicitly deemed unacceptable prior to invoking the more ex-
pansive powers codified by 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3. 
The fundamental reform needed for this vaccine EUA path-
way is a rebalancing of the fundamental regulatory concerns of 
safety and efficacy. The traditional EUA pathway’s requirement 
is minimal for both safety and efficacy.187 An emerging infectious 
disease vaccine EUA should retain the current standard for effi-
cacy but look to the normal FDA approval process for its safety 
standards. 
iii. The Proposed Emergency Infectious Diseases Vaccine EUA 
Standard for Efficacy 
The traditional EUA standard for efficacy188 is appropriate 
in the context of emerging infectious diseases. When a therapy 
has a large or clear benefit it will generally be possible to ascer-
tain this quickly.189 However, when the efficacy is smaller a 
larger sample size will be necessary to obtain the same level of 
certainty with regards to efficacy.190 In the context of an emerg-
ing infectious disease, it is desirable that the FDA approve vac-
cines that have passed a rigorous safety threshold where there 
is a preponderance of evidence that they are also efficacious, but 
where it will take significantly more time to determine this for 
certain due to the logistical challenges of running long-term clin-
ical trials necessary to ascertain the real world effectiveness of a 
vaccine.191 Often the size of the effect on an individual’s immun-
ity will be small, and it would require a very large clinical trial 
 
 187. See 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c) (requiring only that the product may be 
effective, and that its “known and potential benefits” outweigh the “known and 
potential risks”). 
 188. See 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(c)(2) (“[B]ased on the totality of scientific evi-
dence available to the Secretary, including data from adequate and well-con-
trolled clinical trials, if available, it is reasonable to believe that— (A) the prod-
uct may be effective in diagnosing, treating, or preventing— (i) such disease or 
condition . . . .”). 
 189. See Biau et al., Statistics in Brief: The Importance of Sample Size in the 
Planning and Interpretation of Medical Research, 466 Clinical Orthopaedics Re-
lated Res. 2282, 2286 fig.2 (2008) (showing the relationship between confidence 
interval and sample size). 
 190. Id. 
 191. There are a variety of logistical challenges to running clinical trials in 
areas with outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. See Jon Cohen & Martin 
Enserink, Updated: Past Failures Shadow Current Hopes of Testing Drugs Dur-
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to properly quantify the effect in order to reach a finding of ef-
fectiveness, which might take years. However, even marginal in-
creases in immunity compound when vaccination is widespread, 
resulting in vaccine-induced herd immunity.192 A vaccine with 
50% efficacy is better than no vaccine at all193 and a small effect 
size compounds to protect many as a result of vaccine-induced 
herd immunity. 
There are compelling scientific arguments to embrace a 
marginally lower standard of efficacy in the context of an emerg-
ing infectious disease. In the context of the SARS-CoV-2 pan-
demic variants of concern have emerged.194 There is some evi-
dence that these variants spread faster,195 and some have 
 
ing an Ebola Outbreak, SCI. (June 4, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.science-
mag.org/news/2015/12/special-report-ebolas-thin-harvest (explaining how logis-
tical issues have impaired the completion of clinical trials for Ebola). 
 192. See generally Randolph & Barreiro, supra note 6 (explaining the con-
cept of herd immunity in the context of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic). By way of 
example, the effectiveness of the yearly flu vaccine in individuals is not partic-
ularly impressive, ranging from 40-60% effective depending on the year. How 
Effective Is the Flu Vaccine?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 
16, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/vaccineeffect.htm. 
 193. In the context of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic the FDA announced it 
would consider vaccines that met a 50% efficacy threshold for an EUA. See JUNE 
FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2 at 14 (“To ensure that a widely deployed COVID-
19 vaccine is effective, the primary efficacy endpoint point estimate for a pla-
cebo-controlled efficacy trial should be at least 50%, and the statistical success 
criterion should be that the lower bound of the appropriately alpha-adjusted 
confidence interval around the primary efficacy endpoint point estimate is 
>30%.”). 
 194. See SARS-CoV-2 Variants, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION (Jan. 31, 2021) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-up-
dates/variant-surveillance/variant-info.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2021) (dis-
cussing evidence of variants of concern, commonly referred to as mutants); see 
generally Rochelle P. Walensky, et al., SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Concern in the 
United States—Challenges and Opportunities, J. AM. MED. ASS’N (2021), 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2021.2294 (discussing the prevalence of these var-
iants at the time and the United States’ planned response). 
 195. See SARS-CoV-2 Variants, supra note 194 (reporting a 50% increase in 
transmissibility in the variant of concern B.1.1.7 based on preprint studies). 
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suggested the variants could render vaccines and other thera-
peutics less efficacious,196 though it is premature to reach con-
clusions about either assertion.197 Regardless it is certainly true 
that when a previously zoonotic illness becomes endemic in the 
human population it will be subjected to selection pressure.198 
Further, the faster the virus spreads, the more opportunities 
there will be for mutation.199 Effectively this means that the vi-
rus will evolve faster if it is allowed to spread unchecked and 
infect a greater number of hosts.200 The first line of defense 
against this must necessarily be nonpharmaceutical interven-
tions.201 Still, getting access to a vaccine marginally faster, even 
 
 196. See Zijun Wang et al., mRNA Vaccine-Elicited Antibodies to SARS-CoV-
2 and Circulating Variants, NATURE (2021), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-
03324-6 (“Taken together the results suggest that the monoclonal antibodies in 
clinical use should be tested against newly arising variants, and that mRNA 
vaccines may need to be updated periodically to avoid potential loss of clinical 
efficacy.”). 
 197. See Adam S. Lauring & Emma B. Hodcroft, Genetic Variants of SARS-
CoV-2—What Do They Mean?, 325 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 529, 531 (2021), 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.27124 (discussing why it will take time to de-
termine what impact, if any, the variants of concern will have). 
 198. See generally Colin R. Parrish et al., Cross-Species Virus Transmission 
and the Emergence of New Epidemic Diseases, 72 MICROBIOLOGY MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY REVS. 457, 457–470 (2008), https://pub-
med.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18772285 (“Here we review what is known about host 
switching leading to viral emergence from known examples, considering the 
evolutionary mechanisms, virus-host interactions, host range barriers to infec-
tion, and processes that allow efficient host-to-host transmission in the new host 
population.”). 
 199. This can be understood logically. If a virus has x opportunities to mu-
tate when it infects a single host, it will have 2x opportunities to mutate after 
spreading to a second one. Consider that viral propagation in a naïve population 
is not linear, but exponential. This is a vastly oversimplified model of viral evo-
lutionary dynamics. See Troy Day et al., On the Evolutionary Epidemiology of 
SARS-CoV-2., 30 CURRENT BIOLOGY R849, R854 Box 2 (2020) (presenting evo-
lutionary modeling data on SARS-CoV-2; “reducing the total number of infec-
tions will reduce the input of SARS-CoV-2 mutations, and thus slow adaptation, 
especially if complex mutations underlie fitness gains.”). This is a complicated 
phenomenon and while it appears to apply to interventions which reduce the 
total number of infections, such as vaccines, it does not apply to interventions 
which redistribute infections over a greater stretch of time such as social dis-
tancing alone. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Nathan D. Grubaugh et al., Public Health Actions to Control New 
SARS-CoV-2 Variants, CELL (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2021.01.044 
(“With potentially more transmissible SARS-CoV-2 variants circulating glob-
ally, public officials should communicate the known health risks and tighten 
the personal, procedural, engineering, and societal control measures that are 
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if it is not particularly effective, will reduce the total number of 
infections and thus reduce the opportunities for the virus to mu-
tate, potentially limiting variants of concern.202 
The traditional EUA standard for efficacy is also appropri-
ate because it promotes personal choice and because traditional 
concerns about fraud are lessened in an emergency. People want 
access to therapies, and once the FDA is reasonably certain the 
therapies are safe there is no reason to hold back in an emer-
gency. There is an argument that providing individuals with 
credible information and trusting them to make the correct med-
ical decision results in higher levels of vaccination than govern-
ment mandates.203 There is also a concern that otherwise safe 
therapies will be used to defraud204 and FDA authorization 
might be viewed as a tacit source of approval. However, the tra-
ditional EUA standard for efficacy still provides protection from 
facially fraudulent therapies.205 The proposed elevated safety 
standard compensates for the admittedly deferential efficacy 
standard because meeting the proposed safety standard will re-
 
known to be effective at decreasing transmission. These include the following: 
reducing social contacts, effective testing and tracing, robust outbreak identifi-
cation and control, support to ensure effective isolation and quarantine, and 
population vaccination.”). 
 202. There is a subsequent question as to what statutory standard for safety 
is appropriate when testing ‘booster’ shots intended to address variants of con-
cern. The scientific questions underlying the appropriate standard are complex 
and are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 203. See Drew, supra note 167 (“The problem highlighted by the WHO ear-
lier this year was not vaccine refusal, but vaccine hesitancy. In most countries, 
the proportion of the population that staunchly opposes vaccines is less than 
2%. The bigger problem, Salmon says, is the much larger group of people with 
some concerns about vaccination that might make them hesitant. He estimates 
that up to one-third of Americans have concerns about vaccines. ‘Making the 
laws stricter doesn’t address that,’ he says.”). 
 204. See Beware of Fraudulent Coronavirus Tests, Vaccines and Treatments, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-up-
dates/beware-fraudulent-coronavirus-tests-vaccines-and-treatments (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2021) (providing consumers information on avoiding fraudulent 
SARS-CoV-2 therapies). 
 205. For example, if faced with a facially fraudulent vaccine it should be 
trivial for the FDA to refuse to conclude that “based on the totality of scientific 
evidence available to the Secretary . . . the product may be effective in diagnos-
ing, treating, or preventing— (i) such disease or condition” when there is no 
possible mechanism or data to support a product sponsored for an EUA. 21 
U.S.C. §360bbb-3(c)(2). 
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quire performing some clinical trials and doing so would gener-
ate sufficient efficacy data206 for the FDA to make a more in-
formed final determination as to efficacy.207 At this point the de-
cision must be left to physicians and individuals to decide 
whether the magnitude of the benefit outweighs any potential 
risks in an emergency.208 The FDA could still impose labeling 
requirements to ensure consumers are adequately informed of 
the evidence of efficacy.209 The FDA’s role as a gatekeeper who 
protects from fraud210 must necessarily give ground in an emer-
gency. 
 
 206. Even phase I clinical trials include measurements of immunogenicity. 
See e.g., Edward E. Walsh et al., Safety and Immunogenicity of Two RNA-Based 
Covid-19 Vaccine Candidates, 383 N. ENG. J. MED. 2439, 2448–49 fig.4 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2027906 (reporting safety and immunogenicity 
of the vaccines including the Pfizer vaccine that went on to receive an EUA). 
 207. If there is still no data to support efficacy after performing a phase II 
clinical trial, it would seem appropriate that the FDA refuse to issue an author-
ization as a lack of data amounts to accepting the null hypothesis that the ther-
apy does nothing. 
 208. There is a historical debate about whether the FDA can or does regulate 
the practice of medicine. See Wendy Teo, FDA and the Practice of Medicine: 
Looking at Off-Label Drugs, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 305, 305–306 (2017) (“The 
Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’) has always taken a deferential stance 
with regard to the practice of medicine, and maintains that it will not interfere 
with the physicians’ autonomy in this regard. This is otherwise known as the 
‘practice of medicine exception.’ However, the reality is that it is often difficult 
to draw a clear line between the role of FDA in safeguarding the public from 
unsafe drugs and the autonomy that physicians have in prescribing off-label 
medication in the practice of medicine.”) 
 209. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(a) only creates an exemption to the interstate 
commerce liability hooks in the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 
355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate 
commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to 
subsection (b) or (j) is effective with respect to such drug.”). A variety of provi-
sions can define products as adulterated or misbranded for failing to meet la-
beling or general safety requirements. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (“A drug or de-
vice shall be deemed to be misbranded . . . [i]f its labeling is false or misleading 
in any particular.”). 21 U.S.C. § 331 still makes it a violation to introduce or 
receive an adulterated or misbranded product in interstate commerce. The most 
natural reading of § 360bbb-3(a) would leave § 331’s prohibitions intact, and the 
FDA could therefore still bring enforcement actions for general safety and la-
beling concerns. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 et seq (codifying the FDA’s enforcement 
mechanisms). 
 210. Cf. United States v. 88 Cases, Bireley’s Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967, 
972 (3d Cir. 1951) (holding that the FDA can condemn a food product as adul-
terated if sufficient proof is provided that a consumer would confuse it for a 
superior product). 
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iv. The Proposed Emergency Infectious Diseases Vaccine EUA 
Standard for Safety 
The most important distinction between the traditional 
EUA standard and this proposal is that the proposed emerging 
infectious disease vaccine EUA would use the standard of safety 
from 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1), (2), and (4).211 Notably this proposal 
excludes the safety provision of 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(3) which pro-
hibits approval if: “the methods used in, and the facilities and 
controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and pack-
ing . . . are inadequate to preserve its identity, strength, quality, 
and purity . . . .” This Note’s proposal excludes 21 U.S.C. § 
355(d)(3) because the FDA has redundant regulatory authority 
to prevent the introduction of products manufactured to unde-
sirable settings from entering interstate commerce both in the 
proposed approval framework212 and elsewhere in title 21.213 Re-
quiring companies to demonstrate “identity, strength, quality, 
and purity” to the FDA before receiving an EUA in an emergency 
would therefore unnecessarily slow authorizations when the 
 
 211. These read in relevant part “If the Secretary finds . . . [(1) the submis-
sions] do not include adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable to 
show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; (2) the results of 
such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions or do not 
show that such drug is safe for use under such conditions . . . (4) upon the basis 
of the information submitted to him as part of the application, or upon the basis 
of any other information before him with respect to such drug, he has insuffi-
cient information to determine whether such drug is safe for use under such 
conditions . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 212. This proposal also explicitly calls for the adoption of 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-
3(c)(5) into the emerging infectious disease vaccine EUA standard. It requires: 
“that such other criteria as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe are sat-
isfied” be met prior to issuing an authorization. 21 U.S.C. 360bbb-3(c)(5). Given 
that the vaccines being discussed necessarily relate to emergencies, the FDA 
would also be within its rights to make use of ‘good cause’ authority codified at 
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) to expedite the process. See generally Babette E.L. Boliek, 
Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency Emergency 
Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3353–71 (2013) (reviewing regulatory 
agency emergency rulemaking authority). 
 213. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 351 (which deems drugs adulterated if they meet a 
wide variety of standards including standards which relate to identity, 
strength, quality, and purity). This section is incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) 
and therefore applies to vaccines. 
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FDA already has the authority to effectively regulate “identity, 
strength, quality, and purity.”214 
Under the proposed standard the burden is on the sponsor 
to provide enough evidence of safety to satisfy the FDA and ap-
proval can be denied if the FDA is not convinced the product is 
safe based on available data,215 if adequate tests have not been 
performed to determine safety,216 or if there is any indication 
that the FDA has inadequate information to make a determina-
tion of safety.217 Adopting this standard would raise the burden 
of proof required to issue an EUA; this is desirable for vaccines 
developed to prevent emerging infectious diseases because pub-
lic confidence in a vaccine’s safety is intrinsically tied to the vac-
cine’s ultimate aim of protecting public health. A public that does 
not trust that the vaccine is safe will not get the vaccine, and the 
population as a whole will not achieve vaccine-induced herd im-
munity. A higher standard of safety in this context is also desir-
able because unlike other therapies, vaccines are given prophy-
lactically to individuals who are not yet sick and therefore 
necessarily are used on many more individuals than other kinds 
of therapeutics. A higher incidence of use implies a higher stand-
ard of safety is required.218 
 
 214. If congress felt that a priori regulation was more desirable than the 
increase in speed obtained from excluding 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(3) this would cer-
tainly be a valid and defensible position. This Note only argues that the regula-
tory oversight provided by § 355(d)(3) is marginal and slightly redundant, but 
the speed gained by excising this section might be equally marginal. If congress 
wishes to include the safety standard of § 355(d)(3) it should consider modifying 
this standard to indicate that this is meant to merely be a ‘paper review’ as in 
person inspections of manufacturing facilities are often impractical during an 
emerging infectious disease outbreak. 
 215. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 216. See id. 
 217. See id. 
 218. Because vaccines are theoretically given to every healthy individual in 
order to achieve the desired outcome the risk of rare side effects is necessarily 
multiplied. See Offit et al., supra note 8, at 1629 (“Because vaccines are given 
to healthy children and adults, a higher standard of safety is generally expected 
of immunizations compared with other medical interventions.”). 
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C. CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSAL AND RESPONSES 
i. An Emerging Infectious Disease EUA Would Not Undermine 
Consumer Autonomy 
One criticism of the proposed emerging infectious disease 
EUA could be that the traditional EUA system is still capable of 
maintaining consumer trust while also promoting personal lib-
erty and earlier access to vaccines. A hypothetical informed con-
sumer could rationally decide that they do not want to get a vac-
cine approved under the traditional EUA standard and wait for 
full approval. The traditional EUA approach thus maximizes 
personal choice for this hypothetical informed consumer. 
This criticism is flawed for a number of reasons. First, it as-
sumes that consumers are always intimately informed about the 
FDA authorization and subsequent approval of therapies. This 
is unlikely to be the case.219 It is unlikely that consumers under-
stand the distinction between an EUA and full FDA approval.220 
However, under the proposed standard public health advocates 
would be able to argue that the law requires emerging infectious 
disease vaccines be proven safe, a simple and easy to digest mes-
sage. Second, this argument ignores the lost institutional trust 
incurred from a single incorrect regulatory decision as demon-
strated by the EUA issued for HCQ. In practice, consumers are 
disproportionately exposed to the FDA’s regulatory failures ra-
ther than successes.221 This may imply that the average con-
sumer will have a negatively skewed perception of the FDA’s ac-
tions, further undermining the premise that the hypothetical 
informed consumer even exists. Third, this argument ignores the 
 
 219. See Thaler, Richard H. & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter 
Consumers, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 2013, https://hbr.org/2013/01/smarter-
information-smarter-consumers (arguing that even highly educated consumers 
do not make informed decisions); see also Daniel L. McFadden, The New Science 
of Pleasure, 1–37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 18687, 2013), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w18687/w18687.pdf (re-
viewing economic and historical evidence of irrational consumer behavior). 
 220. See Helen W. Sullivan et al., Consumer Understanding of the Scope of 
FDA’s Prescription Drug Regulatory Oversight: A Nationally Representative 
Survey, 29 PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 134, 138 (2020), (“The re-
sults from our survey are in line with results from previous studies and suggest 
that there is a consistent proportion of consumers who carry some misconcep-
tions about prescription drugs, [and] what FDA approval of prescription drugs 
means . . . .”). 
 221. See, e.g., Sacerdote et al., supra note 93 (analyzing the media landscape 
of SARS-CoV-2 media coverage). 
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FDA’s actions in the instant crisis. The FDA has required a high 
standard of safety evidence to approve the Pfizer and Moderna 
vaccines,222 in effect using the proposed elevated evidentiary 
standard while still paying the institutional credibility price of 
using the traditional EUA pathway. 
Personal choice is desirable, but it is outweighed by ensur-
ing institutional credibility which will promote the public good 
of population level immunity as a result of widespread vaccina-
tion. Attempting to maximize personal choice sounds good in 
theory, but practical concerns should prevail in the field of public 
health. 
ii. An Emerging Infectious Disease EUA Would Not Undermine 
Regulatory Flexibility 
Another criticism of a higher safety standard is that it un-
dermines the FDA’s regulatory flexibility.223 Regulatory flexibil-
ity is particularly desirable for EUAs because the circumstances 
that lead to an EUA are necessarily unique and unforeseeable. 
An emerging infectious disease with characteristics closer to 
Ebola requires a more extreme regulatory response in light of a 
 
 222. See OCTOBER FDA GUIDANCE, supra note 2 (indicating that the FDA 
was willing to issue an authorization following an interim analysis of a phase 
III clinical trial at the earliest). Phase I and II vaccine clinical trials typically 
focus on obtaining safety data while phase III trials are more focused on efficacy 
data. See Hudgens et al., supra note 157 at 89 (“For vaccine candidates that are 
safe and immunogenic in Phase I and II trials, Phase III trials (n ~ 1000–100 
000) are employed to evaluate efficacy of the vaccine within the population of 
interest. Vaccines that prove to be safe and efficacious in Phase III trials may 
be licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency.”). See also Step 3: Clinical 
Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, https://www.fda.gov/pa-
tients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research (last visited Jan. 8, 
2021) (stating the purposes of phase I, II, and III are “[s]afety and dosage[,]” 
“[e]fficacy and side effects[,]” and “[e]fficacy and monitoring of adverse reac-
tions” respectively). 
 223. Cf. Walter G Johnson & Gary E Marchant, Legislating in the Time of a 
Pandemic: Window of Opportunity or Invitation for Recklessness?, 7 J. L. & BI-
OSCIENCES 1, 8 (2020), (“Substantively, emergency policymaking may result in 
regulatory norms or programs poorly calibrated to the longer-term and complex 
set of stakeholder interests and policy concerns at play. Specifically in food and 
drug crisis decision-making, Peter Barton Hutt comments ‘[a]s is often true un-
der those conditions, the legislation has been shaped as much by public emotion 
as rational policy design.’ Accordingly, legislatures tend to underregulate a 
problem before a crisis occurs, but often overregulate after disaster strikes.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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mortality rate in excess of 50%.224 However, the proposed ap-
proach does not abolish the traditional EUA pathway. To access 
the traditional EUA pathway, the proposal only requires a find-
ing that the proposed pathway is inadequate to address the 
emergency, promoting accountability and discouraging inappro-
priate use of the traditional pathway. Thus, the proposed emerg-
ing infectious disease vaccine EUA does not undermine regula-
tory flexibility, but rather strengthens it. Undoubtedly, the FDA 
also wishes to exert its own sound scientific judgment rather 
than be subject to political influence in making regulatory deci-
sions. A suitable statutory framework strengthens the FDA’s 
hand by promoting accountability for political actors. The FDA 
would still be able to take extreme measures if it felt this was 
necessary while still being forced to explicitly find the powers 
granted under the proposed statute are insufficient. The institu-
tional damage from a poor regulatory decision made because of 
the lower standard may legitimately be justified in the context 
of a war or an infectious disease outbreak with a mortality rate 
in the double digits. But this tradeoff seems normatively unwise 
in the context of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.225 
iii. An Emerging Infectious Disease EUA Would Not 
Undermine Speed 
There is an argument that a greater emphasis on safety 
would undermine the FDA’s ability to quickly authorize neces-
sary therapies. There is a recurring concern that if the FDA’s 
standards for regulation are too high this will hinder access to 
potentially lifesaving therapies.226 This is a valid concern in the 
context of a pandemic, as there are unlikely to be any therapies 
 
 224. See Kucharski & Edmunds, supra note 186, at 1260 (reporting Ebola 
case fatality rates ranging from 50 to 70% depending on the outbreak and meth-
odology). 
 225. There is no question that the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has affected na-
tional security. The issue is one of magnitude. Widespread community trans-
mission of Ebola would affect national security in a much more fundamental 
way than the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has. 
 226. See, e.g., Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no constitu-
tional “right to try” experimental therapies that have not been approved by the 
FDA); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (creating said “right to try” under partic-
ular circumstances). 
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available and a speedy approval process is certainly desirable.227 
However, this argument is less convincing when applied to vac-
cines for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the proposed emerging infectious disease vaccine 
pathway would leave the existing EUA pathway intact while 
making it clear that such a pathway is intended only for the most 
serious emergencies. The existence of a hypothetical pathway 
earmarked for emerging infectious diseases would be a strong 
signal that such a pathway should be used for this purpose. The 
FDA would also be forced to make an explicit finding that the 
proposed pathway was insufficient to invoke traditional EUA 
powers making the FDA more accountable for this act. There-
fore, the proposed pathway does not undermine speed when 
speed is necessary, rather it promotes accountability for employ-
ing EUAs when they are unnecessary. If the public felt that a 
lower safety standard was warranted in light of the circum-
stances, there would be no (or a minimal) political cost to pay for 
using a traditional EUA.228 
Secondly, speed is worthless if people do not get the vaccine. 
The metric by which we should measure public health is not 
whether an untested vaccine is available, but whether people 
use it. There is ample survey evidence that employing a vaccine 
perceived to be less tested increases vaccine refusal.229 There is 
 
 227. Faster access to therapies is always desirable; the trick is ensuring they 
are safe and efficacious while balancing these concerns in abnormal circum-
stances. See Tomas J. Philipson et al., Assessing the Safety and Efficacy of the 
FDA: The Case of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Rsch., Working Paper No. 11724, 2005) (reviewing the perennial debate of 
safety, efficacy, and speed). 
 228. India, for instance has embraced a lower standard of evidence in ap-
proving a vaccine and is experiencing significant political backlash. See 
Aniruddha Ghosal & Sheikh Saaliq, India’s Quick Nod to Homegrown COVID-
19 Vaccine Seeds Doubt, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 11, 2021), https://ap-
news.com/article/asia-pacific-clinical-trials-india-coronavirus-pandemic-coro-
navirus-vaccine-16a4c1cfb1b6b5def70812e638e5fc54 (reporting on issues with 
India’s rapid rollout of an experimental vaccine); see also Emily 
Schmall & Karan Deep Singh, A Mix of Pride and Doubts as Modi Launches 
India’s Covid-19 Vaccine Drive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.ny-
times.com/2021/01/15/world/asia/coronavirus-india-vaccine.html (reporting on 
the same issues of trust with the experimental vaccine). 
 229. See Guidry et al., supra note 41, at 140–41 (reporting survey data in 
tables 4 & 5 showing “[c]oncern about side effects of [a hypothetical] vaccine” 
and the perception that “[d]evelopment [was] too rushed to test safety” both 
strongly correlate with vaccine refusal); see also Kreps et al., supra note 41, at 
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also evidence that individuals are much less likely to get a vac-
cine authorized via EUA than one that receives traditional FDA 
approval.230 Vaccines serve to protect individuals,231 but a vac-
cination program’s ultimate goal is to protect the population as 
a whole, including individuals who are unable to get vaccines 
due to underlying health conditions.232 If an untested vaccine 
undermines widespread vaccination this undermines the most 
fundamental public health goal of vaccination, which is to pro-
tect the population as a whole from the disease, not just an indi-
vidual. 
Thirdly, there is no reason to think that the FDA could not 
quickly determine that a vaccine was safe even using a higher 
standard of safety. It is true that 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) lays out a 
higher standard of safety than 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c), but the 
standard of § 355(d) is still highly deferential to the FDA.233 Fur-
 
1 (reporting survey data showing that a “decrease in the incidence of major ad-
verse effects from 1 in 10 000 to 1 in 1 000 000 was associated with a higher 
probability of choosing a [hypothetical SARS-CoV-2] vaccine (coefficient, 0.07; 
95% CI, 0.05-0.08).”). 
 230. See Guidry et al., supra note 41, at 139 (“Of the total sample, 30.7% of 
respondents were definitely planning, 29.2% were probably planning, 18.8% 
were neutral, 9.4% probably not planning and 11.9% would definitely not plan-
ning [sic] to receive a future COVID-19 vaccine. When asked if they would get 
the vaccine under the EUA, 10.4% reported being definitely willing to do so, 
14.2% willing, 22.3% somewhat willing, 14.3% somewhat unwilling, 16.4% prob-
ably unwilling, and 22.3% definitely unwilling.” (emphasis in original)); see also 
Kreps et al., supra note 41 at 1 (“An FDA emergency use authorization was 
associated with a lower probability of choosing a vaccine (coefficient, −0.03; 95% 
CI, −0.04 to −0.01) compared with full FDA approval.”). 
 231. See generally Rémy et al., supra note 8, at 1 (reviewing evidence of mod-
ern vaccine efficacy). 
 232. See Randolph & Barreiro, supra note 6, at 737 (explaining the concept 
of herd immunity). 
 233. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) indicates that approval should be denied if “[(1) sub-
missions to the FDA] do not include adequate tests by all methods reasonably 
applicable to show whether or not such drug is safe for use under the conditions 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; (2) the 
results of such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such conditions 
or do not show that such drug is safe for use under such conditions . . . (4) upon 
the basis of the information submitted to him as part of the application, or upon 
the basis of any other information before him with respect to such drug, he has 
insufficient information to determine whether such drug is safe for use under 
such conditions . . . .” The principal change is that this standard shifts the bur-
den of proving safety to the sponsor. However the FDA still receives substantial 
deference in determining whether this standard has been met. See, e.g., Ubi-
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thermore, in the context of vaccines the FDA can make a deter-
mination of safety using the standard from § 355(d) in a time 
frame similar to the EUA timeline for the Pfizer and Moderna 
vaccines.234 In a vaccine clinical trial, the phase III component 
must last years in order to assess the effectiveness of the vaccine 
at preventing disease long term.235 Trials can be performed 
much faster when safety is the sole concern, because in the con-
text of vaccines adverse safety events are clustered around the 
administration of the vaccine itself.236 However, if Congress is 
 
otica Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 427 F.2d 376, 378–79 (6th Cir. 1970) (af-
firming a denial of NDA pursuant to § 355(d)); cf. United States v. Article of 
Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969) (demonstrating the significant def-
erence the FDA receives in interpreting the FDCA). 
 234. While the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines were approved using an EUA, 
both vaccines underwent phase I, II and an interim analysis of phase III clinical 
trials pursuant to FDA guidance. See PFIZER-BIONTECH BRIEFING, supra note 
119 (containing data supporting the EUA of the Pfizer vaccine); see also 
MODERNA BRIEFING, supra note 119 (containing data supporting the EUA of 
the Moderna vaccine). This amount of safety testing would seem to meet the 
proposed safety standard of 21 U.S.C. §355(d) which indicates in relevant part 
that approval should be denied if “[(1) the submissions] do not include adequate 
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is 
safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
proposed labeling thereof; (2) the results of such tests show that such drug is 
unsafe for use under such conditions or do not show that such drug is safe for 
use under such conditions . . . (4) upon the basis of the information submitted 
to him as part of the application, or upon the basis of any other information 
before him with respect to such drug, he has insufficient information to deter-
mine whether such drug is safe for use under such conditions . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 
355(d). 
 235. See generally Hudgens et al., supra note 157, at 89–114 (reviewing the 
purposes of the different phases for vaccine clinical trials and appropriate sta-
tistical methods). 
 236. It is true that in testing any new therapy it is difficult to predict when 
and what side effects will arise. However, vaccine side effects are logically 
linked to the immune system on which the vaccine acts. See COMMITTEE TO 
REVIEW ADVERSE EFFECTS OF VACCINES, Evaluating Biological Mechanisms of 
Adverse Events, in ADVERSE EFFECTS OF VACCINES: EVIDENCE AND CAUSALITY 
57–101 (Kathleen Stratton et al., eds 2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK190017/ (reviewing the causal mecha-
nisms of vaccine side effects); see also Caroline Hervé et al., The How’s and 
What’s of Vaccine Reactogenicity, 4 NPJ VACCINES 39, 39–50 (2019), (reviewing 
the biology of vaccine side effects and making clinical recommendations). While 
vaccines make permanent changes to the immune system in the form of immune 
memory the most common side effects of vaccination appear and resolve rela-
tively quickly after vaccination with the adaptive immune system returning to 
immune homeostasis within about a month of a challenge. See KENNETH MUR-
PHY & CASEY WEAVER, JANEWAY’S IMMUNOBIOLOGY 24 fig.1.25 (9th ed. 2017) 
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worried that the safety standard from § 355(d) would slow ap-
proval, it might consider appending the safety standard with 
language that requires the FDA to consider safety in light of the 
circumstances that necessitate the use of an emergency author-
ization.237 
Finally, it is important to remember that the proposed path-
way is intended to be based on the standard employed in practice 
in issuing EUAs for the Pfizer and Moderna SARS-CoV-2 vac-
cines.238 This Note argues the statutory standard of safety codi-
fied by 21 U.S.C. 355(d)(1), (2), and (4) be adopted, not the prac-
tices of the FDA in satisfying these standards in the course of 
reviewing and NDA. Ultimately, a speedy approval process is de-
sirable, but a desire for regulatory expediency cannot arrive at 
the expense of safety in the context of vaccines, because optimal 
 
(showing the course of a typical antibody response to immunization). This hy-
pothesis holds in practice, with the vast majority of vaccine side effects being 
observed soon after administration in clinical trials. See World Health Organi-
zation, Module 3: Adverse Events Following Immunization, VACCINE SAFETY 
BASICS, https://vaccine-safety-training.org/vaccine-reactions.html (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2021) (reviewing evidence of onset interval for serious adverse events 
post vaccination); see also G L D’alò et al., Frequently Asked Questions on Seven 
Rare Adverse Events Following Immunization, 58 J. PREV. MED. & HYGIENE. 
E13, E13–E26 (2017), (reviewing evidence of the association between adverse 
events and time post vaccination); Jerome H. Kim et al., Looking Beyond 
COVID-19 Vaccine Phase 3 Trials, 27 NATURE MED. 205, 208 (2021) (“There are 
certain safety-related events that, due to rarity or pathogenesis, might be de-
tected only during longer-term surveillance for adverse events after immuniza-
tion. The FDA guidance for Emergency Use Authorization suggests a median 
duration of follow-up of phase 3 vaccine trial volunteers of 2 months. Most 
events are expected to fall within that window after vaccination.”); This Week 
in Virology, With Vaccines, Offit Is on it, MICROBE.TV, at 18:20 (Feb. 14, 2021), 
microbe.tv/twiv/twiv-720/ (discussing the FDA’s process of determining vaccine 
safety and experiences participating in vaccine clinical trials with Dr. Paul Offit 
in the context of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic). In light of these immunological 
precepts, it seems likely that phase I, II, and an interim analysis of phase III 
clinical trials are “adequate tests . . . to show whether or not such drug is safe 
for use . . . ” because such trials will follow patients for more than a month, and 
thus will be capable of detecting side effects if they are adequately powered. 21 
U.S.C. § 355(d). 
 237. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3(c)(2)(B) provides language that could serve as a 
model: “taking into consideration the material threat posed by the agent or 
agents identified [in the initial emergency declaration] . . . .” This would ensure 
that the FDA considers not only the safety and efficacy any hypothetical vaccine 
in isolation, but also that it balances the need for safety and efficacy against the 
magnitude of the “material threat.” Id. 
 238. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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public health outcomes for vaccines rely on safety in a way that 
other therapies do not. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The crisis of legitimacy at the FDA was not caused by any 
single factor. The emergence of a respiratory pandemic disease 
was not a regular occurrence, but it was also not entirely unex-
pected.239 There will be respiratory pandemic diseases in the fu-
ture.240 America has a history of populist Presidents pushing the 
boundaries of norms241 and it will likely have norm pushing 
Presidents in the future. Rebuilding trust in the FDA as an in-
stitution will require strengthening the regulatory guardrails 
and rethinking the policy tradeoffs that lead to the development 
of the EUA process as currently codified in 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-
3. 
The fundamental balance of safety and efficacy for vaccine 
EUAs that issue for emerging infectious diseases should be 
based on a statutory and regulatory framework grounded in pub-
lic health outcomes, not a statute that was intended to allow the 
emergency approval of therapies for troops engaged in “[m]ili-
tary [o]peration[s] . . . .”242 Public health concerns unique to vac-
cines demand safety. Widespread use on healthy individuals re-
quires a balance of safety and efficacy, but necessarily favors 
 
 239. See Gates, supra note 27 (predicting future viral respiratory pandem-
ics). 
 240. See Bedford et al., supra note 7, at 130 (“With rapidly changing ecology, 
urbanization, climate change, increased travel and fragile public health sys-
tems, epidemics will become more frequent, more complex and harder to pre-
vent and contain.”). 
 241. See Martin Eiermann, How Donald Trump Fits into the History of 
American Populism, 33 NEW PERSP. Q. 29, 29–34 (2016), (reviewing the history 
of American populism and placing the Trump presidency in this context) see 
also Yascha Mounk & Jordan Kyle, What Populists Do to Democracies, THE AT-
LANTIC (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar-
chive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/ (arguing populists 
harm democratic institutions). 
 242. See Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1999 Pub. L. No. 105-261 § 731(a), 112 Stat. 1920, (establishing a “Process 
for Waiving Informed Consent Requirement for Administration of Certain 
Drugs to Members of Armed Forces for Purposes of a Particular Military Oper-
ation”). 
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safety.243 Further, because widespread use is a necessary predi-
cate to realizing the ultimate goal of vaccination-induced herd 
immunity244 the public must trust that any vaccine is safe. Thus, 
an emphasis on safety is doubly important in the context of vac-
cines. Finally, a lack of institutional trust in the safety of FDA 
approved vaccines affects public health through reduced uptake 
of the instant vaccine, but also through reduced uptake of vac-
cines more broadly as a result of vaccine hesitancy.245 An em-
phasis on safety is therefore paramount and the regulatory 
framework for emergency vaccines should reflect this. 
It is true that the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines produced in 
the context of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic appear to be safe, but 
the FDA was forced to resist significant political pressure to en-
sure that this was the case.246 The FDA may not be able to do so 
in the future. An alternative regulatory pathway will not under-
mine the FDA’s regulatory flexibility, but rather promote ac-
countability. It will not slow the regulatory approval of effective 
therapies, because vaccine efficacy is largely dependent on vac-
cination uptake. A vaccine the public trusts that arrives a hypo-
thetical month later (if that) is worth ten times a vaccine that no 
one elects to receive. Formally rebalancing the statutory frame-
work for emerging infectious disease vaccine EUAs will restore 
institutional trust in the FDA, allowing it to better carry out its 
public health mandate. 
 
 243. See Offit et al, supra note 8, at 1629 (“Because vaccines are given to 
healthy children and adults, a higher standard of safety is generally expected 
of immunizations compared with other medical interventions.”). 
 244. See Randolph & Barreiro, supra note 6, at 737 (explaining how wide-
spread immunity in a population slows the spread of an infectious agent). 
 245. See Trogen et al., supra note 134, at 2461 (“Failing to abide by stand-
ards of safety and scientific rigor during the COVID-19 crisis will fuel the argu-
ment that physicians and scientists cannot be trusted. Vaccination rates, which 
are declining due to widespread concern about visiting clinicians’ offices, could 
further decrease. The US could see resurgences of many vaccine-preventable 
illnesses, and inevitably, massive increases in avoidable deaths and irreversible 
outcomes.”). 
 246. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
EUA Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3
Appendix I
Emergency Declaration by Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of Defense, Secretary 
of HHS or identification of material threat pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b by Secretary of 
HHS.
Any of the above emergency declarations must include a finding that this emergency cannot 
be addressed under 21 U.S.C. § XXX. 
Amend 21 U.S.C. §360bbb-3(c)(2)(A)(ii) to permit normal EUAs to issue to treat conditions 
caused by products authorized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § XXX.
Note: Large parts of the text in these proposed statutes are taken from the current  version 
of  21 U.S.C. §§ 360bbb-3 and 355(d). Quotation marks have been removed to ensure 
readability. What is presented here should be treated as a guide to what is proposed, not 
as proposed language. Aspects that would be necessary in a final version of either of these 
statutes have been omitted for clarity of the proposal. Proposed additions indicated with a 
black box, additions of interest are indicated with underline.
Declaration that the circumstances exist justifying the authorization by Secretary of HHS 
including findings:
(1) The agent in question can cause a serious or life-threatening disease or condition.
(2) Based on the totality of scientific evidence available to the Secretary of HHS including 
data from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials, if available:
 (a) it is reasonable to believe that the product may be effective in diagnosing, treating 
or preventing the subject of the emergency declaration; and
 (b) the known and potential benefits of the product outweigh the known and potential 
risks when used to treat the subject of the emergency declaration taking into 
consideration the material threat posed by the subject of the declaration.
(3) There is no adequate, approved, and available alternative to the product. 
(4) That such other criteria as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe are satisfied.
Proposed 21 U.S.C. § XXX
Emergency Declaration by Secretary of HHS that there is a public health emergency, or a 
significant potential for a public health emergency, that affects, or has a significant potential 
to affect, national security or the health and security of United States citizens living abroad 
which involves an emerging infectious disease in humans.
Declaration that the circumstances exist justifying the authorization by Secretary of HHS 
including findings:
(1) The agent in question can cause a serious or life-threatening disease or condition.
(2) Based on the totality of scientific evidence available to the Secretary of HHS including 
data from adequate and well-controlled clinical trials, if available, it is reasonable to 
believe that the vaccine product may be effective in diagnosing, treating or preventing 
the subject of the emergency declaration 
(3) There is no adequate, approved, and available alternative to the vaccine product.
(4) That such other criteria as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe are satisfied.
(5) Authorization shall not issue:
 (a) if submissions to the FDA do not include adequate tests by all methods reasonably 
applicable to show whether or not such vaccine is safe for use under the conditions 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof; and
 (b) the results of such tests show that such vaccine is unsafe for use under such 
conditions or do not show that such vaccine is safe for use under such conditions; 
and
 (c) upon the basis of the information submitted to the FDA as part of the application, 
or upon the basis of any other information before the FDA with respect to 
such vaccine, the FDA has insufficient information to determine whether 
such vaccine is safe for use under such conditions.*
*This standard is taken in large part from 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(1), (2), (4).
